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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON WORKER VALUE AND CONTRACTS IN TEAM 
ENVIRONMENTS 
by 
Thomas Paul Zimmerfaust 
 
In many work environments, production occurs in teams. The value of that team’s 
product, the productivities of workers’ teammates, and workers’ individual 
productivities help determine the value of workers to a firm, their wages, and the 
lengths of their contracts. This dissertation uses data from Major League Baseball to 
investigate these relationships. The first chapter estimates the relationship between 
team production and firm revenue and uses the estimated relationship to comment on 
the valuations of workers made previously in the literature. The second chapter 
analyzes wages and provides evidence that the young in the sample are willing to 
trade away wages to join more productive teams. The third and final chapter tests 
whether worker productivity uncertainty affects contract length and finds that length 
does increase with uncertainty. An abstract for each chapter is provided below. 
Chapter 1: This study finds evidence that the absence of firm fixed effects 
from regressions of Scully’s (1974) firm revenue equation leads to overestimating a 
player’s marginal revenue product by at least 164%. This result is consistent across 
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two sets of seasons, is robust to two different measures of firm revenue and the most 
commonly controlled revenue sources, and occurs even in commonly used variations 
of Scully’s (1974) revenue equation. This finding suggests that studies that have 
previously used the estimates of a baseball player’s MRP or assume a conclusion 
drawn from such a study may need to be reexamined. 
Chapter 2: This study finds that an average free agent trades away wages to 
join a team expected to be more productive. More importantly, the young in the 
sample drive this result: an average, young free agent trades roughly 25% of his 
wages to join a team with an expected productivity one standard deviation higher. In 
contrast, the wages of older free agents are unaffected by expected team productivity. 
These results are robust to a variety of wage-determinant controls, remain consistent 
across a set of robustness checks, and suggest that better teams provide an important 
human capital investment opportunity. High-quality measures of both workers’ own 
past productivity and the expected productivity of a worker’s future team provide key 
advantages to identifying these effects. This study is the first to show that the 
expected productivity of the team a worker will join produces a significant and 
negative compensating wage differential and may offer an opportunity to invest in 
human capital. 
Chapter 3: This study finds evidence supporting worker productivity 
uncertainty as a contract-length determinant. This result is robust to a variety of 
worker- and firm-specific controls, is consistent across two different measures of 
uncertainty for two different types of worker productivity, and supports Danziger’s 
viii 
 
(1988) efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. This study improves upon previous studies 
that analyze the relationship between real uncertainty and contract length by using 
worker- and firm-specific data for the first time. This key advantage allows this study 
to control, at the finest level, for contract-length determinants that could complicate 
analysis when using more aggregated data, a common problem acknowledged in the 
literature. Specifically, it allows Danziger’s (1988) hypothesis to be tested with real 
uncertainty measures derived from the productivity history of individual workers. 
Finally, the sensitivity of a third measure of uncertainty provides an initial look into a 
promising area of future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WHAT IS WRONG WITH MLB ESTIMATES OF A PLAYER’S MARGINAL 
REVENUE PRODUCT?  
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1.1 Introduction 
In his seminal paper, Scully (1974) used worker and firm data from Major League 
Baseball (MLB) to estimate a worker’s marginal revenue product (MRP) for the first 
time. His study compared these estimates to players’ actual wages to determine the 
degree of monopsonistic exploitation in the MLB labor market, thereby launching a 
large and still-active literature that uses these estimates to analyze monopsony in 
MLB (e.g. Scully 1989; Zimbalist 1992; Bradbury 2010). Their use, however, grew 
beyond quantifying the exploitation of players. The literatures that have used the 
estimates of baseball players’ MRPs include, but are not limited to, discrimination 
(e.g. Raimondo 1983; Hill and Spellman 1984), the winner’s curse (e.g. Cassing and 
Douglas 1980; Burger and Walters 2008), market size-wage effects (e.g. Sommers 
and Quinton 1982; Burger and Walters 2003), bargaining power (e.g. MacDonald and 
Reynolds 1994), the superstar effect (e.g. Mullin and Dunn 2002), and the 
productivity-wage relationship (e.g. Blass 1992). Scully’s (1974) MRP methodology 
has even penetrated the popular news press and allowed sports columnists to estimate 
draft values (e.g. Ball 2013) and the quality of offseason player trades (e.g. Silver 
2005). 
Although different variables have been included and some changes to the 
MRP methodology have been made, each study follows one particular feature of the 
third step in Scully’s (1974) original methodology – the absence of firm fixed effects 
in the firm revenue equation, which estimates the revenue contribution from team 
performance. This is surprising. Over the past 40 years, fixed effects have become 
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standard in empirical research and have even been used in Scully’s (1974) second 
step, which estimates the contributions of team-aggregate production measures to 
team performance, to control for any team-specific effects on performance (e.g. 
Krautmann 1999; Krautmann et al. 2000). Furthermore, the properties of Scully’s 
(1974) methodology have undergone extensive discussion, culminating in a back and 
forth between Krautmann and Bradbury (Krautman 1999, 2013; Bradbury 2013) that 
crystalized the universal value of Scully’s (1974) methodology: “if one is interested 
in the efficiency consequences of a new long-term contract or whether a player 
“earned” his salary – then the Scully approach is warranted” (Krautmann 2013). 
Because the MRP estimates from Scully’s (1974) methodology have been so 
widely used, it is critical that the methodology properly estimates MRPs. This study 
argues that it does not. The absence of firm fixed effects from the firm revenue 
equation leads to systematically overestimating the revenue generated by team 
performance. Because this estimate affects the MRP of every player multiplicatively, 
a large upward bias can produce substantial effects on estimated MRPs, potentially 
affecting conclusions drawn from those estimates. 
This study uses panel data from two sets of MLB seasons, 2007 to 2011 and 
1995 to 1999, to demonstrate the substantial decrease in the estimated revenue 
generated by team performance, and, therefore, player MRPs, when including firm 
fixed effects. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 
provides an overview of Scully’s (1974) methodology and the relationship between 
team performance and firm revenue in MLB. Section 1.3 discusses the data and 
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variables used in the analysis of that relationship. Section 1.4 presents the results and 
discusses their implications. Section 1.5 concludes the paper. 
1.2 Performance-Revenue Relationship 
Scully (1974) estimates a baseball player’s MRP through a three-step process. First, 
each of player 𝑖’s productivity measures in season 𝑡, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑓,𝑡
𝑚 , where 𝑚 denotes 
different productivities, is averaged with his teammates’ to form a team-level value of 
each productivity, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑡
𝑚 . Second, team 𝑓’s performance, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡, is regressed on 
the team-level values and a vector of controls, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡, to estimate the coefficient, 𝛾
𝑚, on 
each productivity: 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 = ∑ (𝛾
𝑚𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑡
𝑚 )𝑚 + 𝑌𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑌. Third, firm 𝑓’s revenue, 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡, is regressed on team performance and a vector of time-varying controls, 𝑋𝑓,𝑡: 
(1.1.1) 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛼𝑋 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡, 
where 𝜀𝑓,𝑡 is the error. The estimate of a player’s MRP is then calculated as the 
estimate on team performance, ?̂?1, times the sum of the products of the estimate on 
each team-level productivity value, 𝛾𝑚, and the corresponding productivity measure 
of the player, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖
𝑚; therefore, 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖 = ?̂?1(∑ 𝛾
𝑚𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑚 ). 
The estimate on team performance in equation 1.1.1, ?̂?1, is critical to 
calculations of MRP. Because it affects every productivity measure of every player 
multiplicatively, any percentage change in ?̂?1 produces a corresponding change in 
every player’s MRP. An insignificant or relatively small estimate, therefore, would 
imply that a player’s productivity is worth little, regardless of his contribution to team 
5 
 
performance. A significant and meaningful ?̂?1, however, has been consistently 
estimated in the MRP literature, leading to the consensus that a player’s productivity 
generates considerable revenue for his firm. Such a consistent result is not surprising 
when observing the actual data. As seen in Figure 1.1, the data for the 2007 to 2011 
seasons illustrate a significant relationship between total annual firm revenue, which 
is inflation adjusted to 2011 dollars, and winning percentage. 
A key assumption to this observed relationship, and the structure of equation 
1.1.1, is that each observation is independent. This assumption, however, is likely 
inappropriate. If each observation is instead assumed to be related by firm, the 
observed relationship between total annual firm revenue and winning percentage 
significantly diminishes, showing firm revenues that are relatively static and largely 
unaffected by team performance (Figure 1.2). Such a discrepancy in the observed 
relationship is not specific to just this time period. Total annual firm revenue, 
inflation adjusted to 1999 dollars, and winning percentage from the 1995 to 1999 
seasons illustrate similar relationships (Figures 1.3 and 1.4). 
Such a visual discrepancy in the relationship between firm revenue and team 
performance suggests a change to equation 1.1.1 may be necessary. In addition to 
time-varying controls, the revenue equation may need to include firm fixed effects, 
𝛿𝑓: 
(1.2.1) 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑋 + 𝛿𝑓 + 𝜖𝑓,𝑡. 
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If the difference between ?̂?1 and ?̂?1 is significant, or even if the difference in their 
magnitudes is sufficiently large, then the MRP literature and many of the studies that 
have used estimates of baseball players’ MRPs may need to be reevaluated. 
1.3 Data 
The first and most common dependent variable used in equation 1.1.1 is the total 
annual revenue earned by each firm. Intuitively, this makes sense. Proper calculations 
of the MRP of a baseball player must account for the full revenue generated by his 
skills. This study uses the previously mentioned total annual firm revenue, as 
estimated by Forbes magazine, from the 2007 to 2011 seasons as a measure of 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡.
1
 
Several studies, however, have analyzed the accuracy of these estimates and 
have found that, although they are the best available data source of total firm revenue, 
the estimates contain nontrivial measurement error (e.g. Krautmann 1999; Krautmann 
2013). Additionally, because these measures may contain centrally shared industry 
revenue, such as national television contracts, estimates of the revenue generated 
from team performance could be systematically too large (e.g. Krautmann 1999; 
Krautmann 2013). To avoid such measurement error and upward bias, a few studies 
have instead used observable measures that correlate with total firm revenue yet avoid 
centrally shared revenue sources, such as game attendance or turnstile revenue. The 
estimates from these various dependent variables still imply the same outcome: team 
                                                 
1
 http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=126 
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performance is a substantial contributor to revenue, implying player productivity is as 
well. 
The previously mentioned revenues for the 1995 to 1999 seasons are 
unaffected by both problems. The revenue measures for these seasons are provided in 
the report released by the Independent Members of the Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon 
Panel on Baseball Economics (Levin et al. 2000). These measures contain only the 
actual “local” revenue sources for each firm, eliminating both measurement error and 
the potential upward bias. 
In addition to regressing total revenue on the variable of interest, winning 
percentage, each regression includes controls for the most commonly discussed 
revenue sources: market size, stadium characteristics, and time effects. This study 
follows the literature and uses the population estimate of the metropolitan area 
surrounding each MLB firm, 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑓,𝑡, as a proxy for market size. The U.S. Census and 
Statistics Canada supply the estimates.
2
 The measurement of the metropolitan areas 
differs between the two sets of seasons but is consistent within each. For metropolitan 
areas with two firms, such as New York, this study again follows the most common 
approach in the literature and matches each firm to 50% of the metropolitan area 
population (e.g. Scully 1974, Krautmann 1999, Burger and Walters 2003). Although 
no consistent measure of stadium characteristics is used in the literature, several 
papers characterize stadiums by a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
stadium is considered “new” (e.g. Mullin and Dunn 2002; Burger and Walters 2003; 
                                                 
2
 http://www.census.gov/population/metro/; 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a33?RT=TABLE&themeID=3433& spMode=tables&lang=eng. 
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Burger and Walters 2008). This study considers a stadium to be “new” if it has been 
used for five or fewer years. Finally, this study uses season dummy variables to 
control for any time effects on firm revenue. The summary statistics for each variable 
for the 2007 to 2011 and 1995 to 1999 seasons are provided in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, 
respectively. 
1.4 Results 
Two important questions need to be answered. First, is there a substantial difference 
in the estimated revenue generated by team performance between the regressions with 
and without firm fixed effects? Second, if there is, what does this difference imply? 
The first two subsections address the first question by investigating several common 
variations of the revenue equation discussed in Section 1.2. The third subsection 
focuses on the second question and additionally discusses how including firm fixed 
effects affects the estimates of the revenue controls. 
1.4.1 Standard Linear Equation 
The results when using the 2007 to 2011 seasons are provided in Table 1.3. The odd 
and even columns contain the estimates from the regressions of equations 1.1.1 and 
1.2.1, respectively, and display a substantial difference between the estimates on team 
performance in equation 1.1.1, ?̂?1, and equation 1.2.1, ?̂?1. The first two columns 
provide results for the univariate regressions of revenue on performance. These 
results quantify the team performance-revenue relationship illustrated in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2. The third and fourth columns contain the results when controlling for market 
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size, stadium characteristics, and time effects. The differences between ?̂?1 and ?̂?1 in 
both pairs of columns are statistically significant at the 1% level. Perhaps even more 
important is that the magnitudes of ?̂?1 are at least 70% smaller than those of ?̂?1, 
implying that MRPs from the regressions without fixed effects are overestimated by 
at least 236%. To put such a difference in perspective, for a one standard deviation 
increase in winning, roughly 11 games, ?̂?1 implies an increase in total revenue of only 
$4.5 million (column 4) instead of the $15.1 million implied by ?̂?1 (column 3). 
Considering the average wage earned by a baseball player between the 2007 to 2011 
seasons was $3.3 million, this difference is analogous to the difference between hiring 
one-and-a-half and four-and-a-half baseball players, roughly the difference between 
paying for 17% and 50% of a team’s lineup.3 
These results are not unique to the Forbes revenue data or the 2007 to 2011 
seasons. The estimates from the same respective regressions, but using the higher-
quality revenue data from the 1995 to 1999 seasons, are provided in columns 1 
through 4 of Table 1.4 and imply the same conclusions. In both pairs of columns, ?̂?1 
and ?̂?1 are again statistically different at the 1% level, but the differences in 
magnitudes are even larger. The magnitudes of ?̂?1 are at least 84% smaller than those 
of ?̂?1 and imply a difference of $13.0 million in 1999 dollars (columns 3 and 4). Such 
                                                 
3
 http://www.usatoday.com/sports/mlb/salaries/. The average salary includes all players, including both 
free agents and non-free agents, listed on the opening day team rosters and disabled lists. Only nine 
players can participate in a game at any one time. 
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a gap corresponds to hiring nine baseball players at the average salary ($1.4 million) 
for that timeframe, the equivalent of paying for a team’s full lineup.4  
1.4.2 Past Performance and Market-Size Interactions 
Two additional variations of the revenue equation have been discussed and should be 
addressed. First, Zimbalist (1992) argues that a team’s performance from the previous 
season, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡−1, could affect revenue in the current season through season-ticket 
sales and broadcasting appeal, implying 
(1.1.2) 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛼𝑋 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡 
(1.2.2) 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑋 + 𝛿𝑓 + 𝜖𝑓,𝑡. 
In this context, the estimates of players’ MRPs depend on the sum of the coefficients 
on the team performance variables, ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 and ?̂?1 + ?̂?2. Again, the relationship 
between the estimated revenue generated by team performance and a player’s MRP is 
multiplicative, implying that any percentage change in the sum of the performance 
coefficients changes the MRPs of all players by that same percentage. For example, 
player 𝑖’s estimated MRP that results from equation 1.1.2 is 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖 = (?̂?1 +
?̂?2)(∑ 𝛾
𝑚𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑚 ). Despite the intuitiveness of Zimbalist’s (1992) variation, only a 
few studies have adopted it (e.g. Krautmann 1999). 
In contrast, the variation introduced by Sommers and Quinton (1982) has 
gained notable attention (e.g. Zimbalist 1992; Burger and Walters 2003, 2008). They 
use an interaction between team performance and market size and find that winning 
                                                 
4
 http://www.usatoday.com/sports/mlb/salaries/. The average salary includes all players, including both 
free agents and non-free agents, listed on the opening day team rosters and disabled lists. 
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in bigger markets has a larger impact on revenue than winning in smaller ones, 
suggesting 
(1.1.3) 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛼𝑋 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡 
(1.2.3) 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑓,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑋 + 𝛿𝑓 + 𝜖𝑓,𝑡. 
Like the two previous variations of the revenue equation, any change in the estimated 
revenue generated by team performance changes the MRP of all players; however, in 
this variation the market size of a firm also affects the overall change to the estimated 
MRPs of that firm’s players. This effect can be observed in the estimated MRP that 
results from equation 1.1.3: 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑓 = (?̂?1 + ?̂?𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑓)(∑ 𝛾
𝑚𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖
𝑚
𝑚 ). For 
simplicity, the differences between the regression results for equations 1.1.3 and 1.2.3 
will be discussed in the context of a firm with an average city population, 𝑃𝑂𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
Regression results for equations 1.1.2, 1.2.2, 1.1.3, and 1.2.3 for the 2007 to 2011 and 
1995 to 1999 seasons are provided in columns 5 through 8 of Tables 1.3 and 1.4, 
respectively. 
Turning first to the estimates in columns 5 and 6 that use lagged winning 
percentage, the differences between the conventional equation (equation 1.1.2) and 
the equation with firm fixed effects (equation 1.2.2) are consistent with the regression 
results provided in columns 1 through 4. The sums of the estimates, ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 and 
?̂?1 + ?̂?2, are significantly different at the 1% level for each pair of columns in both 
tables. The smallest difference is again observed in Table 1.3, which provides the 
results for the data from 2007 to 2011. For this set of seasons, the magnitude of 
?̂?1 + ?̂?2 is 62% smaller than that of ?̂?1 + ?̂?2, implying the MRPs estimated from the 
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regression of equation 1.1.2 are overestimated by at least 164%. Although the 
overestimation of the estimates is smaller than in columns 1 through 4, this is still a 
large discrepancy. In the context of the 2007 to 2011 MLB labor markets, ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 
implies that winning 11 additional games increases total revenue by $22.9 million 
(column 5) over that and the subsequent season. For the same increase in wins, 
?̂?1 + ?̂?2 implies an increase of only $8.3 million (column 6), which is equivalent to 
hiring four-and-a-half fewer players or paying for 50% of a team’s lineup less than 
the amount implied by ?̂?1 + ?̂?2.  
Finally, the results provided in columns 7 and 8 of Tables 1.3 and 1.4 yield 
similar conclusions. The differences in the relevant functions of the estimates, 
?̂?1 + ?̂?𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and ?̂?1 + ?̂?𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , are statistically significant at the 1% level for each 
pair of columns in both tables. Both sets of seasons imply that the estimated revenue 
generated by the winning of a team with an average sized market, and, therefore, each 
player’s MRP that is on such a team, is at least 69% less when using firm fixed 
effects (equation 1.2.3) as opposed to not (equation 1.1.3), implying that MRPs 
estimated from equation 1.1.3 are overestimated by at least 228%. Translating this 
difference into the 2007 to 2011 MLB labor markets, ?̂?1 + ?̂?𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  implies that an 
increase of 11 wins increases revenue by $15.7 million (column 7, Table 1.3). This is 
$10.9 million more than what ?̂?1 + ?̂?𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  implies, corresponding to hiring three-
and-a-half additional players or paying for 39% of a team’s lineup.  
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1.4.3 Implications 
Regardless of the controls, structure of the revenue equation, or seasons, the 
differences between using firm fixed effects or not are significant at the 1% level and 
imply sizeable percentage differences in the estimated revenue generated by team 
performance. As previously mentioned, these differences, in turn, imply equally 
sizeable percentage differences in the calculations of baseball players’ MRPs. 
Estimates from the regressions that use firm fixed effects are at least 62% and 73% 
smaller for the 2007 to 2011 and 1995 to 1999 seasons, respectively. Of particular 
interest is that the higher-quality data from the 1995 to 1999 seasons consistently 
estimate larger differences between the regression with and without firm fixed effects, 
adding more creditability to these estimated differences. Such strong and consistent 
results imply that past studies have likely overestimated baseball players’ MRPs 
substantially, potentially leading to incorrect conclusions in various literatures. Each 
of these studies and the conclusions they draw may need to be reexamined. 
Such large differences in the team performance-revenue relationship are not 
the only important differences between the equations with and without firm fixed 
effects. The statistical significances of the controls have implications to studies 
outside the MRP literature and even to real-world decisions, such as building a new 
stadium; and the lagged winning percentage variable and the interaction between 
winning and population are important to calculating and understanding a player’s 
value within MLB. Addressing the control variables first, the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects changes the conclusions drawn for each control variable in all three variations 
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of the revenue equation for both sets of seasons. One exception does exist, however: 
the new-stadium variable in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.3 is insignificant in both 
regressions. Such results suggest that the relevant literatures may need to reevaluate 
the importance of each of these potential revenue sources. 
Interestingly, although significantly muted by the addition of fixed effects, 
lagged team performance is significant for both sets of seasons. Because the large 
bulk of the literature ignores this relationship, these results suggest that the literature 
may need to include previous team performance in the revenue equation. In contrast, 
the relationship between market size and team performance appears to be sensitive to 
the inclusion of firm fixed effects. For both sets of seasons, the regression without 
firm fixed effects supports a significant relationship between the two, but this support 
disappears when fixed effects are included. The latter result may be surprising. Firms 
with larger markets should benefit more from additional wins. Such intuition, 
however, assumes sufficient numbers of consumers are sensitive to winning (“fair-
weather fans”). If enough consumers purchase only at elevated levels of winning, 
then more winning in larger markets would create a much larger increase in 
consumption than in markets with fewer potential consumers. The results from 
column 8 in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, however, suggest that such an assumption may be 
wrong and aggregate consumer demand is relatively insensitive to winning. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
Do including firm fixed effects in the revenue equation of MRP calculations affect 
the estimated relationship between team performance and firm revenue in MLB? The 
evidence suggests it does; in fact, the results imply substantial decreases to the 
estimated revenue generated by team performance when including fixed effects in the 
firm revenue regression. These findings are consistent across two separate time series 
with two different measures of total firm revenue and are robust to the revenue 
sources and variations of Scully’s (1974) revenue equation that are commonly found 
in the literature. 
The substantially smaller estimates, at least 62% and 73% smaller for the 
2007 to 2011 and 1995 to 1999 seasons, respectively, are particularly worrisome. 
Many studies that use MRP estimates rely on these magnitudes to form their 
conclusions. For example, studies in the discrimination literature compare the 
estimates of baseball players’ MRPs to their wages and test whether these gaps, or 
lack thereof, are significantly different between different ethnicities. Because the 
revenue generated from team performance affects every player’s MRP 
multiplicatively, the conclusions in each of these studies are drawn from MRP 
estimates that may be systematically and substantially too large. This study finds that 
regressions without firm fixed effects may overestimate MRPs by at least 164%. This 
suggests that the results from each study that either uses MRP calculations or assumes 
a conclusion drawn from such a study may need to be reevaluated. 
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TABLES 
Table 1.1: 2007 – 2011 
Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  
St. 
Dev 
 Min  Max 
Total Season Revenue 
[$100 million] 
 150  2.057  .525  1.382  4.631 
Winning %  150  .500  .066  .346  .636 
City Population [1 million]  150  4.335  2.094  1.545  9.878 
Stadium Age [years]  150  14.953  22.643  0  99 
Revenue and salaries are inflation adjusted to 2011 dollars. 
 
 
Table 1.2: 1995 – 1999 
Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  
St. 
Dev 
 Min  Max 
Total Season Revenue 
[$100 million] 
 144  .592  .319  .120  1.759 
Winning %  144  .500  .070  .327  .704 
City Population [1 million]  144  3.093  1.063  1.460  4.955 
Stadium Age [years]  144  20.125  20.344  0  87 
Revenue and salaries are inflation adjusted to 1999 dollars. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ARE WORKERS WILLING TO PAY TO JOIN A BETTER TEAM? 
  
22 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The idea that firms with undesirable characteristics must pay a wage premium to 
compensate workers, or that workers accept lower wages from firms with desirable 
characteristics, goes back at least to Adam Smith (1776). A large literature has 
attempted to measure the size of such compensating wage differentials (CWDs) for 
various firm characteristics across numerous industries.
5
 Despite the size of the 
literature, little research has studied compensating differentials for the expected 
productivity of the firm’s team a worker will join, or “team quality”. This should 
perhaps surprise academic economists, who seem to place great emphasis on the 
quality of their prospective colleagues when choosing which department to join. 
Three main data challenges are likely responsible for this lack of attention. 
First, reliable measures of workers’ productivities are rarely observed. Even if they 
are, because of the team-production environment, such measures are likely affected 
by spillovers from teammates’ effort (e.g. Falk and Ichino 2006; Mas and Moretti 
2009) and complementarities among teammates’ skillsets (e.g. Lazear 1999; 
Hamilton et al. 2003).. Both of these factors temporarily modify observed worker 
productivity through peer effects specific to the team, thereby introducing team-
specific measurement error and producing positive bias on any estimates of negative 
CWDs (Hwang et al. 1992). Second, each worker must be matched not only with the 
firm hiring him but also with the specific team he joins. This is a particularly difficult 
challenge considering many industries comprise firms that employ multiple teams. 
                                                 
5
 Please see Borjas (2005) for a quick overview of CWDs. 
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Some of these teams may even share workers between them. Third, given that 
workers can be suitably matched, a measure of team quality, the expected 
productivity of the team a worker joins, is also rarely observed. For industries with 
static team production, current or previous team production, if observed, can provide 
a reasonable proxy for team quality; however, if team production is unstable, such a 
proxy may introduce sufficient measurement error to attenuate estimates of team 
quality-wage effects. 
These three challenges may explain why Michaelides (2010) is possibly the 
only other study that has tested for team quality-wage effects. His study used wage 
data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) to test CWD theory across an 
array of possible wage determinants, one being team quality. Although data from the 
NBA match workers and teams, the data from the NBA is not ideal for identifying 
team quality-wage effects. Evidence of complementarities in team-oriented sports, 
specifically the National Hockey League and NBA, was found by Idson and Kahane 
(2000, 2004), implying estimation bias from measurement error in the worker 
productivity measures used by Michaelides (2010). His study also used previous team 
winning percentage to measure team quality despite instability in the variable across 
seasons. Furthermore, he restricted team winning percentage to be binary (either a 
winning or losing season), losing much of the information available in the variable. 
Subsequently, the estimates of the team quality-wage effects were largely 
insignificant, and some estimates were even positive – the opposite of what CWD 
theory predicts.  
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In contrast, this study uses data from the Major League Baseball (MLB) free-
agent market. Like the data used by Michaelides (2010), individual free agents are 
easily paired with their contracting firm and team, and a substantial set of firm and 
worker controls are available.
6
 Unlike the data used by Michaelides (2010), this study 
uses worker productivity data with minimal spillovers and complementarities and 
constructs a continuous and credible team-quality variable. Collectively, these 
properties provide a dataset ideal for analyzing team quality-wage effects, and allow 
this study to identify a significant, negative team quality-wage effect that supports the 
CWD theory of Rosen (1986). This is likely the first study to do so. This study also 
finds that the young drive this effect, suggesting that team quality may provide a 
human capital investment opportunity. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses 
spillovers and complementarities in the context of MLB. Section 2.3 introduces free 
agents and the free agent-market data. Section 2.4 details the data and variables used 
to control for several important wage determinants that may correlate with team 
quality, and Section 2.5 discusses the construction of the main team-quality variable 
used in this study. Section 2.6 presents the main results. It discusses the evidence 
supporting CWD theory and some evidence suggesting that the opportunity for 
human-capital investment may be a key mechanism guiding young workers’ apparent 
preference for better teams. Section 2.7 discusses several factors that complicate 
MLB wage contracts and provides robustness checks for each. Section 2.8 concludes 
                                                 
6
 Professional sports data mitigate several other commonplace data problems that can confound team-
quality analysis in other industries. Please see Appendix A.1for more information. 
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the paper, discussing the potential for detecting team-quality effects in other 
industries and several mechanisms that may produce the estimated team quality-wage 
effects found in this study. This section also offers some anecdotal evidence from the 
history of MLB consistent with the team quality-wage effects estimated in this study. 
2.2 Spillovers and Complementarities 
Properly chosen player productivity statistics from MLB should be unaffected by 
spillovers from and complementarities with teammates. In general, each player puts 
forth top effort, regardless of spillovers from teammates, because individual 
productivity is easily measured and heavily monitored and replacement players are 
readily available for each team. Similarly, choosing proper productivity statistics can 
minimize complementarities between teammates. Unlike other team sports, such as 
basketball, individual tasks, like getting a hit, making a catch, or throwing a ball, 
contribute to team production through individualized pathways and are, therefore, 
largely independent of other teammates’ skillsets. For example, a baseball player 
hitting a ball is unaffected by the actions of his teammates on the bench or those 
currently on the bases; however, a basketball player shooting a shot is affected by his 
location relative to the basket and the defense of his guard, both of which are directly 
affected by the movements and abilities of the shooter’s teammates. As long as the 
chosen productivity statistics only measure a MLB player’s individual tasks, the 
observed production values will be largely independent from teammate 
complementarities. 
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Spillover and complementarity effects from opponents should also not affect 
player productivity statistics systematically. MLB hitting statistics generally exclude 
hits earned from opponents’ fielding mistakes; likewise, fielding statistics generally 
ignore hits that are not hit within a reasonable range of the fielder. A batter’s hitting 
production is, however, determined jointly with the production of the opposing 
pitcher; but the way firms handle player fatigue, the competition schedule among 
teams, and the large number of different opponents that each player competes against 
suggest that each batter and pitcher, on average, competes against similar 
distributions of pitcher and batter skill, respectively, implying minimal systematic 
effects from spillovers or complementarities. 
Because batters don’t fatigue, teams reuse the best hitting lineup for every 
game, minimizing any correlation between batting lineups and the opposing pitcher’s 
productivity. Pitchers, conversely, do fatigue, so teams use pitching rotations to rest 
pitchers with high inning counts. For example, “starting pitchers”, who pitch between 
three and six innings in a game, usually receive at least three games of rest. Teams 
also compete in “series”, a group of three to four games between the same two teams. 
Fixed rest and competition schedules prevent a team from only using certain pitchers 
against certain teams. Theoretically, however, teams could adjust their pitching 
rotations by shrinking rest periods for certain pitchers. Such an adjustment would 
increase the risk of pitcher fatigue and injury and, if used at all, would be used 
sparingly; but if teams do systematically alter their pitching rotations, batters on 
better teams would face better pitching opposition. Consequently, because observed 
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productivity affects wages significantly, batters would prefer playing for worse teams. 
The results in Section 2.6 contradict this. Collectively, these properties suggest that, 
on average, pitching rotations are uncorrelated with batter productivity. 
Finally, each team competes against 18 to 20 different teams over a 162-game 
season and regularly uses a general stock of seven to nine pitchers and at least nine 
batters. The large quantity of opponents each player competes against, coupled with 
the lack of endogenous changes to batting lineups and pitching rotations, ensures each 
batter and pitcher competes against similar distributions of opponent skill, resulting in 
minimal systematic spillovers and complementarities between batters and pitchers. 
In summary, the high visibility and availability of replacement players and the 
unique nature of team production in MLB suggest limited spillovers and 
complementarities between a player and his teammates in certain contexts. Likewise, 
the properties of the player productivity statistics and the organization of the 
competition schedule suggest minimal spillovers and complementarities between a 
player and the opposing team. Collectively, these characteristics imply that 
productivity statistics from MLB can be largely independent of spillover and 
complementarity effects, providing accurate measures of worker productivity and 
limiting the positive bias described by Hwang et al. (1992). The productivity statistics 
chosen for this study are described in more detail in Section 2.4.2. 
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2.3 Free-Agent Market 
The MLB free-agent market begins in late October, immediately following the World 
Series, and concludes by February. Each player becomes eligible for the free-agent 
market through one of three methods: 1) the player has completed at least six years in 
MLB’s major league when his contract expires; 2) the player’s 10-year contract with 
the Japanese major leagues, purchased by a MLB firm, expires; or 3) the player’s 
contract expires and no contract was offered to him by the tender deadline. The 
majority of free agents spend at least eight years in MLB and its minor league 
affiliates before entering the market through method (1), yielding an older and far 
more experienced sample relative to the MLB population. 
Rule changes and poor player evaluations by firms limit the amount of clean 
data. New rules governing the free-agent market were introduced in the 2006 market, 
which finished phasing in during 2007, and modifications to these rules were 
introduced in the 2011 market. As Hakes and Sauer (2006) point out, the majority of 
MLB teams did not evaluate batters effectively until around the middle of the 2000’s 
decade. These two factors result in three years of high-quality data: the 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 free-agent markets. ESPN supplies the list of free agents and their 
contracting firm for each of these three years.
7
 
                                                 
7
 http://espn.go.com/mlb/freeagents/_/year 
29 
 
2.4 Data 
This study compiles data over the three-year period (2008 – 2010 free-agent markets) 
into a repeated cross-section. Like many analyses using MLB data, this study focuses 
on non-pitchers. Pitchers are generally divided into two very different subgroups, 
“starting pitchers” and “relief pitchers”, which raise analytical problems when using 
smaller datasets. Each subgroup is trained differently, used differently, and valued 
differently, requiring starting- and relief-pitcher data to be analyzed separately; 
however, too few observations of each pitching subgroup exist for reliable analysis. 
The rest of this section discusses the data on position-player contracts, worker 
characteristics, and firm characteristics. The summary statistics for each variable 
discussed below are presented in Table 2.1. 
2.4.1 Worker Contracts 
The wage regressions in this study use the inflation-adjusted, total guaranteed wages 
a free agent collects throughout his contract as the dependent variable and control for 
contract length to differentiate contracts with similar wages but different durations of 
payment.
8
 A second purpose for a contract-length control is addressed by Christofides 
(1990), who suggests that contract length affects but is not affected by wages. The 
average contract length observed in the sample is roughly 1.5 years, meaning players 
                                                 
8
 Signing bonuses are guaranteed and, therefore, included, but team re-contracting options are not and, 
therefore, are excluded. Using annualized wages does not change the results or conclusions discussed 
in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. 
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generally negotiate a new contract every couple of years. The contract data are 
supplied by ESPN.
9
 
As previously mentioned, the same rules regulate all contracts from the 2008, 
2009, and 2010 free-agent markets; however, each market contains different skill 
distributions and quantities of free agents, potentially producing some year-specific 
effects on free agent contracts. All regressions use year-specific dummy variables to 
control for any corresponding effects. 
Unlike most other professional sports leagues, no firm salary caps or free 
agent-salary restrictions exist. A “luxury tax”, a wage floor, unobserved performance 
and playing-time incentives, and restrictions on trading type-A and B free agents, 
however, do exist.
10
 These factors might systematically distort the wage data for 
certain free-agent types. The contract data from ESPN are used to construct dummy 
variables to control for free-agent type, and robustness checks for each potential 
distortion are discussed in Section 2.7. 
2.4.2 Worker Characteristics 
Sports Reference supplies the player productivity statistics used in the sample.
11
 
Fielding percentage, 𝑓𝑙𝑑, measures defensive productivity, and on-base percentage, 
𝑜𝑏𝑝, and slugging ratio, 𝑠𝑙𝑔, measure offensive productivity.12 These statistics were 
chosen because they only measure individual tasks, limiting the exposure to spillover 
                                                 
9
 http://espn.go.com/mlb/freeagents/_/year 
10
 MLB contracts Elias Sports Bureau to determine the free agents in the top 20% for their position 
(type A) and those within the top 21-40% (type B). The algorithm is proprietary and not available to 
the public. 
11
 http://www.baseball-reference.com 
12
 Please see Table A.1 in Appendix A.2 for the formula for each performance statistic. 
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and complementarity effects. 𝑓𝑙𝑑 measures a free agent’s ability to catch and throw a 
ball. It excludes any hits that were not hit within a reasonable distance of the free 
agent or were fielded by other players. On some rare occasions, good fielders can 
artificially increase the statistic of a free agent by catching a thrown ball that typically 
would not have been caught, but this does not happen often and can affect only a 
small part of the statistic. Both offensive productivity statistics measure a free agent’s 
individual hitting ability exclusively. 𝑜𝑏𝑝 measures his ability to get safely to first 
base, and 𝑠𝑙𝑔 measures the total number of bases he reaches from a hitting 
opportunity. The hitting production of other players affects neither statistic, and 
actions determined by managers that influence observed production, such as bunting, 
are excluded from both statistics. Because future free-agent productivity is unknown, 
the previous season’s productivity provides a proxy for expected productivity (Quirk 
and Fort 1992).  
This study also controls for free agents moving to different cities and their 
position, age, experience, and fame. Roughly 25% of the free agents in the sample re-
sign with their previous firm. The pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of moving or, 
alternately, working away from home may provide an incentive for free agents to re-
sign with their previous team or with a team based in their current city. All 
regressions include a dummy variable that controls for free agents moving to a new 
city. The data are supplied by ESPN and Sports Reference. 
Free agents, as previously mentioned, are generally older than their non-free 
agent counterparts because they must accrue at least six years in the major league of 
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MLB. The average age of 33.5 and experience of 10.3 years illustrate this 
characteristic of the dataset. Furthermore, because baseball players’ athleticism 
naturally degrades with time, the elevated age of free agents could suggest that free 
agents may care about maintaining current levels of productivity, not just increasing 
them. The position data, along with age and experience, are also provided by Sports 
Reference. 
Finally, fame appears to affect wages in professional sports, even when 
controlling for worker productivity and market size (e.g. Mullin and Dunn 2002; 
Franck and Nuesch 2012). This study uses the prices of Topps baseball cards that 
were printed in the previous season as a proxy variable for fame (Nardinelli and 
Simon 1990; Mullin and Dunn 2002). Becket Media published these prices in their 
annual price guides (edited by Brian Fleischer) in the first quarter of 2009, 2010, and 
2011. The close proximity of the publication date to the conclusion of the 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 free-agent markets suggests that the published prices capture relevant fame 
levels. Each price guide supplies the prices of cards from the preceding year, so the 
price guide printed in 2010 contains the prices for the 2009 series of Topps baseball 
cards. The price guides categorize prices into bins, each corresponding to a different 
level of consumer demand for a player’s card, or “fame”. Due to inflation and 
variations in aggregate demand for baseball cards, the bin values change between 
years. Each card price from 2009 and 2010 is adjusted to match the appropriate 2011 
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price bin.
13
 The typical baseball card price is about 15 cents, the value associated with 
just enough consumer demand to warrant Topps printing a card. 
2.4.3 Firm Characteristics 
The heterogeneity in free-agent productivities provides advantages to firms with 
larger budgets that can, and do, contract the more productive players, thereby 
correlating higher-budget firms with increased team-quality measures. Estimates of 
previous season firm revenue and net operating income, supplied by Forbes, control 
for any budget effects that may correlate with team quality.
14
 These variables also 
control for two potential wage determinants, market size and rent sharing. 
Market size-wage correlation exists in MLB (Burger and Walters 2003). 
Estimates of previous season firm revenue provide a proxy for the expected market 
size of each MLB firm. On a firm-by-firm basis, revenue estimates change, on 
average, by roughly $8.40 million per year between 2008 and 2011, which is roughly 
4% of an average firm’s annual revenue ($206.29 million). Such small year-to-year 
changes imply that the previous season’s revenue estimate supplies a credible proxy 
for the proceeding season’s revenue and market size. 
Even when controlling for worker and firm characteristics, firm profit-wage 
correlation can exist (e.g. Blanchflower et al. 1996; Hildreth and Oswald 1997). 
Estimates of net operating income control for any rent sharing-wage effects. Because 
Blanchflower et al. (1996) found significant evidence that lagged ability-to-pay 
                                                 
13
 For specifics on price adjustments, please see Table A.2 in Appendix A.2. 
14
 http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/33/baseball-values-09_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Rank.html; 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/33/baseball-valuations-10_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Rank.html; 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/33/baseball-valuations-11_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Rank.html. 
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variables most strongly capture rent sharing-wage effects, this study uses net 
operating income from the preceding season. 
In addition to market-size and rent-sharing effects, correlation between firm 
size and worker wages can exist even with worker and firm controls (e.g. Mellow 
1982; Brown and Medoff 1989). Firms in MLB, however, produce teams consisting 
of exactly 40 players; furthermore, the inherent competitiveness and flow of 
information among MLB firms should imply near identical numbers and types of 
trainers, coaches, scouts, and managerial staff. To insure against any omitted variable 
bias from firm size-wage effects, all regressions use firm fixed effects, which also 
control for any other static firm characteristic that may influence free-agent wages. 
2.5 Team Quality 
In MLB, a team’s previous season winning percentage, ?̃?, provided by Sports 
Reference and summarized in Table 2.1, provides an obvious and accessible measure 
for team quality. On a firm-by-firm basis, team winning percentage changes in 
absolute value, on average, by roughly .055 per season between the 2008 and 2011 
seasons. Because approximately 90% of teams in this timeframe finish with a 
winning percentage between .4 and .6, .055 represents roughly 28% of the available 
difference among teams’ own winning percentages between seasons, suggesting that 
any team quality-wage estimate that uses ?̃? will be attenuated from measurement 
error. Additionally, some unobservable variables that help determine winning 
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percentage, such as coaching decisions, may increase free-agent wages, further 
attenuating any negative team quality-wage estimates. 
To better measure free agent and firm expectations about a team’s future 
productivity, a new team-quality variable, ?̂?, is constructed using Scully’s (1974) 
methodology for estimating winning percentage in MLB. The general equation 
describing the winning percentage of team 𝑓 in period 𝑡 is 
(2.1) 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 %𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜂𝑓,𝑡−1
ℎ,𝑙,𝑝 + 𝑍𝑓,𝑡
′ 𝛿 + 𝜖𝑓,𝑡, 
where 𝜂𝑡−1 represents a polynomial for average team hitting (ℎ), fielding (𝑙), and 
pitching (𝑝) that uses player statistics from the preceding season and 𝑍𝑡 is a vector of 
team characteristics. A three-step process constructs the team-quality variable, ?̂?, 
used in this study: 1) an “expected team” is built for every firm for the season 
following each free-agent market, 2) equation 2.1 is estimated using each expected 
team’s average statistics, and 3) ?̂? is predicted for each team using the estimates from 
the second step. The final result is a more precise team-quality variable constructed 
from exogenous team-performance measures and team characteristics. The rest of this 
section follows these steps and concludes with a discussion of two measurement-error 
issues that could result from the ?̂? construction process. 
2.5.1 Step (1): Expected Team 
Each “expected team” comprises the best available position player for each of the 
eight fielding positions, plus a designated hitter for teams in the American League, 
and eight pitchers comprising the best available five starting pitchers and three relief 
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pitchers.
15
 This composition was chosen because it provides a full batting order, 
complete fielding positions, and because roughly 70% of a season’s pitching is done 
by the most frequently used five starting pitchers and three relief pitchers. 
The previous season 𝑜𝑏𝑝, 𝑠𝑙𝑔, and 𝑓𝑙𝑑 determine the “best” position players, 
and strikeouts per walk, 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏, and strikeouts per batter, 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓, from the previous 
season determine the “best” pitchers. Similar to the position players productivity 
statistics, 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏 and 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓 were chosen because they measure the individual task of 
pitching, specifically strikeouts and walks. The fielding abilities of a pitcher’s 
teammates have no effect on these measures. 
In order to minimize the potential for small sample bias, each position player 
and pitcher must also have at least 100 plate appearances (𝑃𝐴) or batters faced (𝐵𝐹), 
respectively, to be eligible. In addition, each position player must play that fielding 
position at some point during the previous or subsequent seasons.
16
 Pitcher selection 
differs from the position player-selection rule: each pitcher must pitch the majority of 
his innings at that pitching position. The difference in position eligibility between 
position players and pitchers reflects the differences in skillsets required to play 
multiple positions. Differences among most fielding positions are negligible, so 
position players commonly fill multiple roles, whereas pitchers train as either a 
starting pitcher or a relief pitcher, rarely both. 
                                                 
15
 Teams in the American League use a designated hitter to replace the pitcher in a team’s batting 
order. This slot is left unfilled in the expected-team roster for National League teams because pitchers 
are never chosen for hitting ability, and they are uniformly poor batters. 
16
 The subsequent season is also used because free agents and firms would know which contracted 
worker would be playing which position. For example, if a firm already has a great shortstop and 
contracts another, but has a terrible second baseman, it would be obvious that the new shortstop would 
replace the remedial second baseman in the following season. 
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The expected position-player rosters of Bleacher Report, a professional online 
sports magazine, were published in articles in February, 2010 (Cappetta 2010) and 
March, 2011 (Trueblood 2011) and provide a metric to measure the credibility of the 
constructed expected teams. Although Cappetta (2010) and Trueblood (2011) likely 
use different information to form their expected rosters, e.g. spring-training 
performance statistics, the position players from the expected teams match 85% of the 
rosters printed by Bleacher Report, suggesting the expected teams are reasonable. 
Bleacher Report supplies neither an expected position-player roster for 2009 nor any 
expected pitching roster for comparison. 
2.5.2 Steps (2) and (3): Estimating ?̂? 
𝜂 is a second-order polynomial comprising all the possible linear and quadratic terms 
of the average 𝑓𝑙𝑑, 𝑜𝑏𝑝, 𝑠𝑙𝑔, 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏, and 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓 of each expected team; and dummy 
variables for the division a team plays within compose 𝑍. Pooled OLS is used to 
estimate equation 2.1, and given these estimates, ?̂? is constructed such that ?̂?𝑓,𝑡 =
?̂?0 + ?̂?𝑓,𝑡−1
ℎ,𝑙,𝑝 + 𝛿𝑍𝑓,𝑡.
17
 The resulting values of ?̂? differ in absolute value from the 
actual winning percentages by an average of .036, roughly a 33% improvement over 
the previous season’s winning percentage, ?̃?. Such an improvement is sizeable and 
explains the stronger team quality-wage effects, which are discussed in Section 2.6, 
when using ?̂? instead of ?̃?. Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics for ?̂? and the 
corresponding statistics for each actual season. 
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 Please see Table A.3 in Appendix A.2 for the regression estimates of equation 2.1. 
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2.5.3 Potential Measurement-Error Issues 
Because employment decisions after the season begins may occur too far in the future 
for free agents and firms to anticipate, each expected team is created from the best 
players contracted to each firm when the season begins. This selection process can 
create two possibilities for measurement error. The first can occur because free agents 
and firms sign contracts before the season begins and, therefore, must create values 
for team quality from estimations of future team compositions. Such free-agent and 
firm estimations cannot be measured, potentially introducing measurement error into 
?̂? by differentiating those free-agent and firm estimations from the actual teams used 
for constructing ?̂?. Two properties, however, suggest this to be unlikely: 1) ?̂? is 
constructed from expected team-productivity averages, and 2 substantial insight into 
player-team matching is readily available to free agents and firms through 
professional sports agents; the considerable experience of free agents and firm 
administrators; the extensive information network among free agents, their sports 
agents, and firm administrators; the wide media coverage of the free-agent market 
and inter-firm trades; and the availability of professional market analysis (e.g. ESPN, 
CBS Sorts, Fox Sports, Elias Sports Bureau, SABR, and countless others). 
Collectively, these suggest that minimal measurement error exists because free agents 
and firms should be reasonably able to estimate the average team productivities of 
their future teams. 
The second possibility for measurement error can exist if free agents don’t 
include themselves when evaluating potential teams. Many of the better free agents in 
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the sample are used in their respective expected teams, potentially increasing the 
productivity of those expected teams above those free agents’ expectations. A 
robustness check is provided in Section 2.7. 
2.6 Results 
This study uses the free market-returns approach, introduced by Krautmann (1999), to 
construct the following equation: 
(2.2) log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂?𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
′ 𝜃𝑃 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝜃𝑋 + 𝑌𝑓,𝑡−1
′ 𝜃𝑌 + 𝜃𝑓 +
𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑓,𝑡, 
where log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 is the logarithm of the total wages free agent 𝑖 will 
receive from firm 𝑓 for the contract signed before the start of season 𝑡; ?̂?𝑓,𝑡 represents 
team quality for firm 𝑓 in season 𝑡; 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of free agent 𝑖’s performance 
statistics from season 𝑡 − 1, specifically 𝑜𝑏𝑝, 𝑠𝑙𝑔, and 𝑓𝑙𝑑; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of free 
agent 𝑖’s characteristics going into season 𝑡, specifically contract length, dummies for 
free-agent type and position, age and age squared, experience and experience squared, 
card price, and whether the free agent is moving to a new city; 𝑌𝑓,𝑡−1 is a vector 
containing firm 𝑓’s revenue and net operating income from season 𝑡 − 1; 𝜃𝑓 are firm 
fixed effects; 𝜃𝑡 are year dummies; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 is the error. 
Table 2.3 reports regression results for equation 2.2 in column 1 and two 
alternative specifications, which are described in the following subsection, in columns 
3 and 5. Columns 2, 4, and 6 contain results for regressions identical to those 
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presented in columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively, except they instead use ?̃? as a measure 
of team quality. As previously mentioned, ?̃? likely suffers from measurement error, 
explaining its attenuated estimates and smaller levels of significance. Overall the 
parallels between ?̃? and ?̂? discussed in this section bolster credibility: the attenuation 
behaves as expected, and both variables imply similar conclusions. 
The negative coefficients on ?̂? and ?̃? in columns 1 and 2, respectively, which 
are significant at the 5% level, support CWD theory by suggesting that free agents 
trade wages for improved team quality. Expected utility gain from increased expected 
winning and/or investment in human capital could produce such an effect. The first 
subsection below discusses age in the context of differentiating the two mechanisms, 
and the second discusses the influence of each mechanism on the team quality-wage 
relationship. 
2.6.1 Mechanism Differentiation 
Age effects create an exploitable difference between the team quality-wage 
relationship expected of younger free agents and their elders. To begin, if team 
quality notably benefits human capital, significant differences in remaining career 
lengths between younger and older free agents (Witnauer et al. 2007) should result in 
team quality-wage effects diminishing as the free agent ages. Conversely, if utility 
from winning largely drives the results, then the expected utility gain from an 
investment in team quality should affect younger and older free agents uniformly. 
If, however, contracts are “sticky”, meaning contracting to a firm increases the 
chance of re-contracting with that firm in the future, and assuming better teams are 
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generally better in the following seasons, younger free agents will acquire more 
utility from winning than their elders from the same team-quality investment. Such an 
age effect would imitate the age effect hypothesized under human capital 
accumulation, preventing the identification of each mechanism’s effect on the team 
quality-wage relationship. The data, however, suggest contracts are not sticky. As 
seen in Figure 2.1, regardless of team winning percentage, free agents contract with a 
different team roughly 70% of the time. Furthermore, younger free agents contract 
with a different team even more frequently, roughly 85% of the time. 
2.6.2 Influence of Potential Mechanisms 
To test the importance of each mechanism to the team quality-wage relationship, the 
estimates reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3 include the interaction between 
both ?̂? and ?̃?, respectively, and a free agent’s age, allowing team quality-wage 
effects to adjust by age. In order to allow the coefficients on ?̂? and ?̃? to capture the 
team quality-wage effect for a 28-year-old free agent, instead of a 0-year-old free 
agent, the age in the interaction term is rescaled by subtracting 28.
18
  
The coefficients on ?̂? and ?̃? again show a negative and significant 
relationship between team quality and wages, and, more interestingly, the positive 
coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that the team quality-wage relationship 
diminishes as free agents age. This result could imply that free agents lose interest in 
team quality as they age, supporting the hypothesis that team quality supplies a 
human capital investment option. The insignificance of the interaction terms, 
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 For more information on the age distribution, please see Figure A.1 in Appendix A.3. 
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however, could signal that no real difference in the team quality-wage relationship 
exists among free agents of different ages, supporting utility from winning as a 
motivation behind the observed team quality-wage effect. 
To see whether there exists a difference in sensitivity to team quality between 
the young and their elders, equation 2.2 is modified to include discrete age categories. 
Three such categories are constructed, each comprising roughly a third of the data: 
free agents 31 and younger (𝐷𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔), free agents aged 32 to 34 (𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒), and free 
agents 35 and older (𝐷𝑂𝑙𝑑). Each age-category dummy is interacted with team quality, 
either ?̂? or ?̃?, thereby measuring the team quality-wage effect for its specific age 
category. All three interaction terms replace the team-quality variable, and 𝐷𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 
and 𝐷𝑂𝑙𝑑 replace the age quadratic in 𝑌, to form the equation 
(2.3) log(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛿1𝐷𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑄𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑄𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐷𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑄𝑓,𝑡 +
𝐷𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 + 𝐷𝑂𝑙𝑑 + Γ𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑓,𝑡, 
where 𝑄 corresponds to ?̂? in column 5 and ?̃? in column 6, Γ contains all other 
relevant variables and parameters from equation 2.2, and 𝜖 is the error. 
The negative team-quality estimates for the younger free agents have large 
magnitudes and are significant at the 1% level in both columns 5 and 6. The estimates 
for the more mature free agents, in contrast, are relatively small in magnitude and 
insignificant, even at the 10% level. Such results indicate that the young are much 
more sensitive to team quality than their elder counterparts, an age effect consistent 
with an underlying human capital investment mechanism and contradictory to a 
mechanism strictly determined by utility from winning. Additionally, the coefficient 
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on the young in column 5 is statistically different from the corresponding coefficient 
on the middle aged at the 10% level, and the coefficients on the young in both 5 and 6 
are close to being statistically different from each of the other corresponding age 
categories (the largest p-value is .167). Such results are consistent with team quality 
affecting young and elder free agents differently. 
The negative sign on the estimates across all ages, however, suggest utility 
from winning may have some small effect on the team quality-wage relationship. 
Furthermore, the failure to reject that the estimates on the young and old are 
statistically different at the 10% level in either column may provide evidence that 
some older free agents do desire to win before they retire, an interesting phenomenon 
observed in many sports. 
The estimates in column 5 correspond to a young free agent trading roughly 
25% of his total wages to increase his expected winning percentage by .05, a change 
of roughly one standard deviation. Such a trade may seem large, but this investment 
may be appropriate for young free agents who should work another 4 to 5 years in 
MLB (Witnauer et al. 2007), the equivalent of roughly two to three additional 
contracts. Preventing a decrease in or, less likely, increasing 𝑜𝑏𝑝, 𝑠𝑙𝑔, and card price 
by one standard deviation each, roughly .035, .073, and .106, respectively, prevents a 
decrease in total wages by roughly 30%, 16%, and 28%. Assuming a young free 
agent maintains this human capital difference into two or three subsequent contracts, 
preventing a decrease in each measure by 19% or 13% of one standard deviation, 
respectively, is enough to repay his initial investment. 
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It is important to note that this break-even calculation considers neither 𝑓𝑙𝑑 
nor any expected utility gain from increased winning. Although the estimates on 𝑓𝑙𝑑 
are insignificant, fielding ability likely has some small positive effect on wages, 
potentially decreasing the amount of human capital accumulation in each attribute 
needed to break even. As previously mentioned, utility gain from winning may 
contribute to the team quality-wage effect, potentially implying that young free agents 
invest less than 25% of their wages in accumulating human capital. The likelihood 
that either factor could affect wages suggests that the above break-even calculations 
form upper bounds on the human capital accumulation needed to justify the estimated 
investment in team quality. 
2.7 Robustness Checks 
This section tests whether the “luxury tax”, wage floor, or unaccounted contract 
incentives mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.4.1 or the potential for 
measurement error in ?̂? discussed in Section 2.5.3 drive the results in Table 2.3. Each 
issue is addressed using equation 2.3 and is contrasted against the coefficient 
estimates on ?̂? from column 5 in Table 2.3, which are provided in column 1 of Table 
2.4 for convenience. The results discussed below are reported in columns 2 through 8 
in Table 2.4, and the concluding subsection summarizes the correlation between of all 
the robustness checks and the main results. 
The luxury tax is a tax on the total money spent on player salaries exceeding a 
predetermined level. Of the 90 teams composing the 2009, 2010, and 2011 seasons, 
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only 5 (created by the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox firms) paid any 
luxury tax, and no tax exceeded 6% of any team’s revenue.19 Column 2 in Table 2.4 
reports estimates from equation 2.3 that exclude free agents contracting with these 5 
teams. If the luxury tax does create a wage distortion, it should lower the wages of the 
free agents whose wages cause their teams to be taxed. This prospect, combined with 
the high team quality of teams built by the Yankees and Red Sox, suggests that the 
estimates of team quality-wage effects in column 1 should have larger magnitudes 
than the estimates excluding free agents from the 5 qualified teams. The opposite 
occurs, most likely explained by both firms’ relative propensity to overspend on free 
agents, particularly the infamous New York Yankees.
20
 
The wage floor was set at $400,000 for each of the three seasons. The only 
time this wage floor binds occurs when a team has an open roster spot with no 
available, appropriately priced free agents to fill it. In such a situation, a firm will 
adhere to the wage floor and overpay a lower value free agent to fill the vacancy on 
its team. The large pool of players, both in MLB and its minor league affiliates, 
should ensure this rarely happens. The dataset contains only two examples, and these 
free agents may be worth the wage. Estimates from a Tobit regression are provided in 
column 3, and the unchanged coefficient estimates suggest that the wage floor 
produces no wage distortions in the data. 
                                                 
19
 Please see Table A.4 in Appendix A.2 for more information on the percentage of revenue paid in 
luxury taxes. 
20
 Comparing the Yankee and Red Sox workers’ predicted log wages against their actual log wages 
suggests that, on average, the Yankees and Red Sox overpay their workers by .620 log-dollar units, a 
large amount considering the average log wage is 6.499. 
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The contract data from ESPN do not contain information on performance or 
playing-time bonuses. Only the very top performing free agents receive any 
performance incentives in their contracts and only the oldest free agents receive 
playing-time bonuses. The small number of contracts containing these provisions and 
the small bonus amounts suggest insignificant distortions on wages. For example, 
winning the MVP award, a silver slugger award, and being selected as an All-Star in 
2010 would have earned David Ortiz a total bonus of $250,000, less than 2% of his 
guaranteed wage for that season. Columns 4 through 7 in Table 2.4 report estimates 
excluding roughly the top 10% of free agents in 𝑜𝑏𝑝, 𝑠𝑙𝑔, 𝑓𝑙𝑑, and age.21 The 
estimates in column 7 suggest that playing-time bonuses create limited, if any, wage 
distortions; but the attenuation of the estimates in columns 4 through 6 of Table 2.4 
could imply that wage distortions from performance bonuses exist in the data. This, 
as previously mentioned, is considerably unlikely. The more likely explanation is data 
loss. The most productive free agents have the most to lose and may value team 
quality disproportionately more than their less productive coworkers, so eliminating 
them could be reducing the average effect of team quality on wages. Regardless, the 
estimates in columns 4 through 7 support team quality as a CWD and imply that the 
young are the principal free agents affected. 
As previously mentioned, if free agents do not include themselves when 
evaluating potential teams, ?̂? could overstate team quality for each free agent who is 
                                                 
21
 The samples used in columns 4 – 7 exclude all free agents with an 𝑜𝑏𝑝 of .374 or higher, roughly 
10.22% of the sample; a 𝑠𝑙𝑔 of .497 or higher, roughly 10.22% of the sample; a 𝑓𝑙𝑑 of 1, roughly 
9.68% of the sample; and an age of 39 or above, roughly 7.53% of the sample, respectively. 
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used in his own expected team. Such measurement error, however, is unlikely for two 
reasons: 1) firms that actively pursue a given free agent are pursuing that free agent to 
attain a set level of team productivity; and 2) given the requisite resources to actively 
pursue such a free agent, those firms have many options available to achieve that 
same level of team productivity, either through alternative free agents and/or inter-
firm trades. In such a context, each free agent that is included in his own expected 
team can be interpreted as a proxy for the various alternatives available to that firm to 
achieve its team-productivity goal, implying the need to include that free agent in his 
expected team. Regardless, to account for the potential for measurement error, new ?̆? 
values are created from team averages that exclude each free agent from his own 
expected team. Team quality-wage estimates using ?̆? are provided in column 8 in 
Table 2.4. Contrary to the estimates using ?̂?, the coefficient on the old is positive and, 
therefore, does not support utility from winning as a mechanism that contributes to 
the negative team quality-wage relationship. Aside from that one exception, however, 
the estimates imply the same conclusions as those drawn from the estimates using ?̂?. 
2.7.1 Summary 
The magnitudes and significances of the estimates and the relationships between the 
estimates on the young and the more elder free agents in columns 2 through 8 
collectively support the conclusions derived from the main findings discussed in the 
previous section. Specifically, the results support team quality as a CWD. 
Additionally, they are also consistent with a human capital investment mechanism 
and, with the exception of the estimates in column 8, could also suggest a small effect 
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from the utility-from-winning mechanism. Even accounting for hypothetical wage 
distortions and measurement error, the estimates in Table 2.4 imply that young free 
agents trade at least 19% of their wages to join a team with an expected winning 
percentage one standard deviation higher. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Does membership in a productive team matter to workers? The results of this study 
indicate that workers do indeed trade wages for team quality, even when controlling 
for worker productivity, firm fixed effects, and a set of time-varying worker and firm 
characteristics. This is likely the first study ever to do so. The results are insensitive 
to a set of robustness checks and are supported by two measures of team quality. The 
analysis in this study improves on previous studies of compensating differentials for 
team quality by using firm fixed effects to control for permanent firm features 
correlated with team quality and by matching workers with their future team, 
allowing for controls of time-varying worker and firm characteristics that correlate 
with team quality. In addition, spillovers and complementarities among teammates 
are minimal in the chosen industry, thereby minimizing estimation bias from 
measurement error in worker productivity and improving the quantification of team 
quality relative to other industries. 
The significant team quality-wage estimates for young free agents, coupled 
with the insignificance of the estimates for older free agents, suggest that young free 
agents drive the negative team quality-wage effect, a result consistent with workers 
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preferring better teams because those teams offer some benefit to human capital. 
Whereas skills learned from abler teammates may, in principle, be firm-specific 
(Becker 1962), occupation-specific (Shaw 1984; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009), 
or task-specific (Gibbons and Waldman 2004;  Gathman and Schönberg 2010), it 
seems likely that task-specific human capital may be the most appropriate investment 
for MLB free agents: fielding and hitting skills are universally sought at all non-
pitching positions; however, occupation-specific skills are also required for each 
specific position. 
The presence of such learning-related wage effects can be tested for indirectly 
in industries other than MLB, even if the data are deficient. Specifically, do firms 
with higher team quality pay younger workers less than their value to the firm, while 
more mature workers receive wages more aligned with their value? Studying team-
quality effects in graduate school enrollment, corporate internship programs, or entry-
level jobs may provide insight into the matching mechanisms between worker and 
firm. 
In addition to productivity-related human capital, at least two alternative 
mechanisms might help account for younger free agents’ willingness to accept lower 
wages to join better teams: membership on a high performing team may increase the 
fame of a worker, and/or being part of a superior team may provide an improved 
signal for firms hiring in the future. Turning first to fame, if team productivity 
increases worker fame, free agents may invest in team quality to collect additional 
future wages from improved fame. Not all increases in fame may be universal; 
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instead, fame may be market-specific, therefore firm-specific. For example, a position 
player with the Boston Red Sox may accrue vastly more fame in the Boston market 
than in the more universal MLB market. Changing firms would reduce the firm-
specific fame capital linked to the Boston Red Sox. Distinguishing between universal 
and firm-specific fame effects on wages, particularly when accounting for team 
quality-wage effects, may illuminate more about the superstar effect and team 
quality-investment decisions. 
Alternatively, free agents may believe that membership in better teams 
improves their productivity signal. Productivity signaling, however, is unlikely to be 
the sole mechanism: the high availability of objective productivity measures imply 
that free-agent productivity should be readily identifiable. As the signaling theory of 
Spence (1973) argues, discernibility eliminates the need for signals. Many 
unobservable skills that correlate with team productivity may exist, however, such as 
being “clutch” or instilling confidence in teammates.22  Being associated with a highly 
productive team may signal firms that a free agent possesses these valuable yet 
unobservable skills. 
                                                 
22
 This study does not control for these unobservable skills, nor does it need to. These types of skills 
would increase wages (otherwise free agents would not invest in them) and would correlate positively 
with team quality; therefore, any bias would attenuate negative team quality-wage effects toward zero. 
If they do exist, then the estimates in Table 2.3 represent a lower bound on the negative relationship 
between team quality and wages.   
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If, as the estimates suggest, workers are willing to accept lower wages to join 
firms with more productive teams, then some interesting implications for the 
competitiveness of labor and product markets follow. If firms that start with a small 
productivity advantage can attract good workers more cheaply than other firms, 
clustering of high-skill workers could lead to productivity stratification across teams. 
Ultimately, this may limit competition and reduce product variety in an industry. 
Interestingly, the history of MLB provides anecdotal evidence supporting this idea. 
All competition for professional baseball has either been eliminated or absorbed by 
MLB since its founding in 1869. Player productivity is also highly clustered: the skill 
of a player dictates participation in a specific set of teams, or “league”, whether the 
major league or one of the six different levels of minor leagues owned by MLB. 
Recently, MLB may have (partially) countered the negative externalities to 
competitiveness that good teams impose on bad ones by instituting regulations on 
amateur player recruitment that benefit the less competitive teams from previous 
seasons. 
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TABLES 
Table 2.1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable 
  Position Players 
  Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Log of Total Wages [log10($)]   186 6.499 .567 5.615 8.276 
Contract Length [years]   186 1.516 1.150 1 8 
On-Base %, 𝑜𝑏𝑝   186 .332 .035 .244 .439 
Slugging Ratio, 𝑠𝑙𝑔   186 .408 .073 .200 .601 
Fielding %, 𝑓𝑙𝑑   186 .982 .017 .857 1.000 
Baseball Card Price [$]   186 .149 .106 0 1.00 
Age [years]   186 33.532 3.200 26 43 
Experience [years]  186 10.301 3.315 3 21 
Moving to a New City  186 .757
†
 --- --- --- 
Type-A Free Agent  186 .113
† 
--- --- --- 
Type-B Free Agent  186 .129
† 
--- --- --- 
No-Type Free Agent  186 .758
†
 --- --- --- 
Position: Outfield  186 .328
†
 --- --- --- 
Position: Infield  186 .468
†
 --- --- --- 
Position: Catcher  186 .204
†
 --- --- --- 
Free Agents in 2008 Market  186 .280
†
 --- --- --- 
Free Agents in 2009 Market  186 .382
†
 --- --- --- 
Free Agents in 2010 Market  186 .339
†
 --- --- --- 
Firm Revenue [$ millions]  90 206.286 54.097 144.56 463.050 
Firm Net Operating Income [$ 
millions] 
  90 17.540 14.254 -30.975 48.405 
Previous Season Winning %, ?̃?  90 .500 .068 .352 .636 
The sample comprises 186 free agents contracting to 90 teams. Wages, revenue, and net operating income are 
inflation adjusted to 2011 dollars. Card prices are matched to 2011 price categories to insure consistency across 
years (see Table A.2 in Appendix A.2). † “Mean” values correspond to the proportion of free agents in the sample 
that fall into each category. 
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Table 2.2 
 Constructed Team Quality & Actual Winning % 
Season 
 Season Averages 
 ?̂?  Actual Winning % 
2009 
 .500 
(.049) 
 
.500 
(.069) 
2010 
 .502 
(.048) 
 
.500 
(.067) 
2011 
 .498 
(.057) 
 
.500 
(.069) 
 
Table 2.3 
Main Results 
Dependent: 
log(𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒔) 
 No Interaction  Age Interaction  
Dummy-Age 
Interaction 
 
?̂? 
(1) 
?̃? 
(2) 
 
?̂? 
(4) 
?̃? 
(3) 
 
?̂? 
(5) 
?̃? 
(6) 
Team Quality (𝑄)  
-1.503** 
(.700) 
-1.208** 
(.578) 
 
-2.572*** 
(.866) 
-1.698** 
(.826) 
   
Team Quality (𝑄) x 
Age 
    
.244 
(.168) 
.081 
(.093) 
   
Team Quality (𝑄) x 
𝐷Young 
       
-2.526*** 
(.689) 
-2.130*** 
(.780) 
Team Quality (𝑄) x 
𝐷Middle 
       
-1.013 
(.824) 
-.955 
(.726) 
Team Quality (𝑄) x 
𝐷Old 
       
-.616 
(1.321) 
-1.115 
(.708) 
          
On-Base % (𝑜𝑏𝑝) 
 
3.388*** 
(.920) 
3.630*** 
(.943) 
 
3.523*** 
(.930) 
3.628*** 
(.955) 
 
3.2139*** 
(.905) 
3.338*** 
(.927) 
Slugging Ratio 
(𝑠𝑙𝑔) 
 
.702 
(.445) 
.662 
(.452) 
 
.700 
(.442) 
.680 
(.455) 
 
.860* 
(.446) 
.857* 
(.457) 
Fielding % (𝑓𝑙𝑑) 
 
2.154 
(1.395) 
2.119 
(1.524) 
 
1.751 
(1.287) 
1.938 
(1.495) 
 
1.838 
(1.313) 
1.707 
(1.540) 
Card Price 
 
1.012*** 
(.210) 
1.020*** 
(.218) 
 
.937*** 
(.214) 
1.007*** 
(.222) 
 
1.016*** 
(.220) 
1.057*** 
(.231) 
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. All regressions control for contract length, free-agent productivity, type, position, age, age squared, 
experience, experience squared, fame, moving to a new city, market size, rent sharing, firm fixed effects, and year 
effects. Each regression uses 186 observations. Columns 1 and 2 have 132 d.f., 3 and 4 have 131 d.f., and 5 and 6 
have 130 d.f. Regressions presented in columns 5 and 6 use dummies for 𝐷𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 and 𝐷𝑂𝑙𝑑 instead of a quadratic 
in age. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Figure 2.1 
Non-Stickiness of MLB Contracts 
All Free Agents
Free Agents
< 32 years old
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EFFECTS OF WORKER PRODUCTIVITY UNCERTAINTY ON THE 
LENGTH OF CONTRACTS  
57 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Although a number of studies examine the determinants of wages, benefits, and other 
features of labor contracts, relatively few investigate the determinants of contract 
length. One topic within this literature, uncertainty, has received a large share of the 
theoretical and empirical attention. The initial theoretical hypothesis, the efficient-
production hypothesis, suggests that increases in uncertainty, regardless of their 
sources, increase contract length (Gray 1978). Generally, unanticipated nominal or 
real shocks, i.e. uncertainty, create deviations between wages and their market-
clearing levels, causing increasing efficiency losses over time and incentivizing 
workers and firms to shorten the length of contracts. It was not until Danziger’s 
(1988) efficient risk-sharing hypothesis that increases in the real uncertainty of 
worker productivity were hypothesized to increase contract length. Danziger’s (1988) 
model theorizes that more risk-neutral firms supply risk-averse workers with wage 
insurance in the form of longer contracts, associating higher levels of productivity 
uncertainty with longer contract length. 
This study tests the contract-length effects of real uncertainty and the positive 
relationship implied by Danziger’s (1988) efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. Unlike 
nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty has received little attention with little consensus 
among the empirical findings. Kanago (1998) and Rich and Tracy (2004) find 
evidence of a negative relationship between real uncertainty and contract length. 
Conversely, Murphy (2000) reports results that real uncertainty increases contract 
length, supporting Danziger’s (1988) hypothesis. Wallace and Blanco (1991) and 
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Wallace (2001) find mixed results that depend upon the industry being studied, 
suggesting that some industries may have multiple mechanisms affecting contract 
length simultaneously (Harris and Holmstrom 1987). 
This is likely an important problem. Apart from the efficient-production 
hypothesis, five other factors may complicate the empirical analysis of the efficient 
risk-sharing hypothesis. Gray (1978) first theorized that both contracting costs and 
indexation, such as a cost of living adjustment, should increase contract length. 
Contracting costs increase the costs of re-contracting, providing an incentive to 
minimize such occurrences; indexation mitigates the efficiency loss from increased 
uncertainty, thereby lengthening contracts. Similarly, investment by a supplier and/or 
purchaser in characteristics of their relationship can increase the value of that 
relationship, thereby also increasing contract  length (e.g. Joskow 1987; Crocker and 
Masten 1988; Brickley et al. 2006; Bandiera 2007). In contrast, Harris and 
Holmstrom (1987) theorize that increased information costs (i.e. renegotiating) may 
decrease contract length. As uncertainty increases, the multi-period value of 
information decays, decreasing the value of new, costly information and shortening 
contract length. Finally, the bargaining-power differential between a contracting 
supplier and purchaser can produce various contract-length effects (e.g. Hendricks 
and Kahn 1983; Murphy 1992). 
Controlling for each of these mechanisms may be infeasible when using 
union- and industry-level datasets. Wallace and Blanco (1991) describe this problem 
perfectly: “The sensitivity of contract length to firm-specific shocks cannot be 
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directly investigated because data limitations prevent an approach more disaggregated 
than the [industry] level.” It may come as a surprise then that no previous studies use 
individual-level contracts with worker and firm controls. This study is the first 
analysis of the real uncertainty-contract length relationship to do so. 
This should be particularly surprising because Danziger (1988) characterizes 
his efficient risk-sharing hypothesis in the context of worker productivity uncertainty. 
Such a deficiency in the literature may be explained by a problem inherent in most 
worker productivity measures. Workers commonly work in teams, affecting each 
other through spillovers in effort levels (e.g. Falk and Ichino 2006; Mas and Moretti 
2009) and complementarities among skillsets (e.g. Lazear 1999; Hamilton, 
Nickerson, and Owan 2003). Each of these team production factors modifies a 
worker’s observed productivity through peer effects specific to the observed team, 
thereby introducing team-specific measurement error and limiting the quality of any 
derived measure of uncertainty. 
This study uses data from the 2008 to 2010 Major League Baseball (MLB) 
free-agent market. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 
discusses the characteristics of the free-agent market that minimize the competing-
mechanism and spillover-complementarity problems and, therefore, provide an ideal 
environment to test Danziger’s (1988) efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. Section 3.3 
introduces the free-agent market. Section 3.4 describes the data and covariates used in 
the analysis of contract length. Section 3.5 details the construction of the uncertainty 
measures used in this study. Section 3.6 introduces the empirical strategy, discusses 
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the results from the real uncertainty-contract length analysis, and addresses the 
robustness of those results. Section 3.7 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Suitability of MLB 
Danziger’s (1988) efficient risk-sharing hypothesis requires several key 
environmental factors, each present in the MLB free-agent market, to hold. 
Additionally, several characteristics of the free-agent market either eliminate or 
control for the competing mechanisms described above. Finally, the data provides 
productivity measures that should be minimally affected by either effort spillovers 
from or skillset complementarities among teammates. The following subsections 
address each of these characteristics of the data. 
3.2.1 Efficient Risk-Sharing Hypothesis 
Three environmental conditions are necessary in order for the efficient risk-sharing 
hypothesis to hold: 1) a sufficient gap in risk aversion exists between worker and 
firm, 2) uncertainty exists in worker productivity, and 3) wages depend sufficiently 
on worker productivity. Without the first condition, firms may not be sufficiently risk 
neutral – relative to their workers – to insure their workers against wage uncertainty. 
The two subsequent conditions ensure that workers face the necessary wage 
uncertainty to want insurance. 
All three of these conditions are interrelated in MLB. Turning first to the 
firms, despite high variance in team winning percentage between 2007 and 2011, 
firms’ revenues are largely stationary over the same time frame (see Chapter 1), 
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implying short-term changes in aggregate player productivity, i.e. team winning 
percentage, produce little revenue uncertainty, and therefore risk, for firms. This is 
discussed further in the following subsection. Free agents, conversely, should be 
highly risk averse with respect to their productivity because their outside wage 
option(s) is likely substantially lower than the minimum major-league wage 
($400,000 per season) and small dips in performance decrease future pay 
substantially (e.g. see Chapter 2; Krautmann 1999). The latter characteristic is 
particularly salient because, as discussed in Section 3.5, free-agent productivity is 
reasonably volatile. Taken together, the characteristics of both firms and free agents 
provide the conditions necessary for the efficient risk-sharing mechanism to affect 
MLB contracts. 
3.2.2 Competing Mechanisms 
If not adequately addressed, several alternative mechanisms – the efficient-production 
mechanism, bargaining-power differentials, indexation, information costs, contracting 
costs, and relationship investment – could complicate the analysis of the efficient 
risk-sharing hypothesis. Turning first to the efficient-production mechanism, two 
conditions are necessary for it to hold: 1) uncertainty exists in worker productivity, 
and 2) firm revenue depends sufficiently on worker productivity over the length of 
the contract. The first condition introduces risk into the system; the second condition 
ensures that this risk affects firms. Without the second condition, firms’ contracting 
decisions will be unaffected by the uncertainty in production, resulting in contract 
length being unaffected. MLB fails the second condition. As discussed in Section 
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3.4.1, free agent contracts are relatively short, so only the short-term relationship 
between firm revenue and productivity is relevant; however, there is little relationship 
between the two (see Chapter 1). Following the method discussed in Section 1.2 and 
regressing revenue from the 2008 to 2011 seasons on winning percentage, season 
dummies, and firm fixed effects yields an estimate of .410 on winning percentage.
23
 
Although the estimate is significant at the 10% level, .410 corresponds to an increase 
of roughly $2.79 million, which is roughly 1.34% of average firm revenue, for a full 
standard deviation increase in winning percentage, roughly .068. Considering each 
free agent produces, at most, during roughly 11% of his team’s available plate 
appearances, variations in his productivity should affect firm revenue minimally (see 
Chapter 1).
24
 This result suggests that productivity uncertainty likely does not affect 
contract length through the mechanism described by Gray (1978). 
Such a small impact on firm revenue could still affect the relationship between 
uncertainty and contract length if firms have significant bargaining power over free 
agents. This, however, is also not a characteristic supported in the MLB free-agent 
market. Firms generally pay free agents either more (see Chapter 1) or close to their 
marginal revenue product (e.g. Zimbalist 1992; Krautmann 1999; Mullin and Dunn 
2002). Likewise, neither indexation nor information costs should affect free-agent 
contracts. Indexation does not exist in MLB contracts, and as discussed in the 
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 These years cover each of the seasons that either precedes or follows the free-agent markets used in 
this study. 
24
 Each non-pitching player, who is currently playing in a game, occupies one of nine positions on a 
team’s batting order. Assuming a free agent plays every inning in every game of a season, he will 
occupy roughly 
1
9
 of all potential plate appearances. 
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following subsection, information costs are homogenous and essentially zero among 
firms and free agents. Finally, controls exist for both contracting costs and 
relationship investment. These are discussed in Section 3.4. 
3.2.3 Spillover and Complementarity Problem 
Worker productivity is readily observable in MLB. Productivity statistics are 
collected by MLB and a collection of amateur enthusiasts and media professionals 
(e.g. Fox Sports, USA Today, Baseball Prospectus, ESPN), resulting in many 
accurate and publically available measures of productivity. Countless studies that use 
MLB productivity data assume that worker productivity measures are minimally 
affected by spillovers and complementarities. Although not specifically testing such 
assumptions, Section 2.2 does posit and defend four main points that collectively 
imply such a property for the productivity measures used by this study: 1) each player 
puts forth top effort independently of spillovers from teammates because individual 
productivity is heavily monitored and replacement players are readily available (e.g. 
Krautmann 1990; Maxcy et al. 2002); 2) the skillset of each worker comprises 
individual-only tasks, such as throwing a ball, implying independence from 
complementarities from teammates’ skillsets; 3) available performance statistics 
generally exclude batter and fielder actions, such as a fielding error, that artificially 
inflate or deflate the opposing fielder’s or batter’s productivity measure; and 4) 
despite joint production between batters and pitchers, each team’s rest schedule for its 
players, the competition schedule for a season, and the large number of different 
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opponents that each player competes against suggest minimal systematic effects from 
production spillovers or complementarities between batters and pitchers. 
3.2.4 Summary 
The MLB free-agent market contains the three environmental conditions necessary 
for the efficient risk-sharing hypothesis to hold. The dataset should also be 
independent of the efficient-production mechanism as well as free from indexation, 
information-cost, and bargaining-power effects. Controls for both contracting costs 
and relationship-investment effects are also available. Finally, the productivity 
measures, which are discussed in Section 3.4.2, should be minimally affected by 
spillovers and complementarities. Collectively, these characteristics provide a dataset 
well suited to test Danziger’s (1988) efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. 
3.3 Free-Agent Market 
The MLB free-agent market begins immediately following the World Series in late 
October and mostly concludes by February. Each player becomes eligible for the 
free-agent market through one of three methods: 1) the player has completed at least 
six years in MLB’s major league when his contract expires; 2) the player’s 10-year 
contract with the Japanese major leagues, purchased by a MLB firm, expires; or 3) 
the player’s contract expires and no contract was offered to him by the tender 
deadline. The large majority of free agents spend at least eight years in MLB and its 
minor league affiliates before entering the market through the first method, yielding 
an older and far more experienced sample relative to the MLB population. 
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Rule changes and poor player evaluations by firms limit the amount of usable 
data. New rules governing the free-agent market were introduced into the 2006 
market and finished phasing in during 2007, and modifications to these rules were 
introduced into the 2011 market. As Hakes and Sauer (2006) point out, the majority 
of MLB teams did not evaluate batters effectively until around the middle of the 
2000’s decade. These two factors result in three years of high-quality data: the 2008, 
2009, and 2010 free-agent markets. ESPN supplies the list of free agents and their 
contracting firm for each of these three years.
25
 
3.4 Data 
This study compiles 182 observations from the 2008 to 2010 free-agent markets into 
a repeated cross-section. Like many analyses using MLB data, this study focuses on 
non-pitchers. Pitchers are generally divided into two very different subgroups, 
“starting pitchers” and “relief pitchers”, raising analytical problems when using 
smaller datasets. Each subgroup is trained differently, used differently, and valued 
differently, requiring starting- and relief-pitcher data to be analyzed separately; 
however, too few observations of each pitching subgroup exist for reliable analysis. 
The rest of this section discusses the data on worker-firm contracts, worker 
characteristics, and firm characteristics. The summary statistics for each variable 
discussed below are presented in Table 3.1. 
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 http://espn.go.com/mlb/freeagents/_/year 
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3.4.1 Worker-Firm Contracts 
The contract-length regressions in this study use the number of seasons specified in 
each free agent’s contract as the dependent variable. Contracts are guaranteed and 
cannot be broken or changed once signed. The average contract length observed in 
the sample is roughly 1.5 years with a standard deviation of a little more than a year, 
meaning players generally negotiate a new contract every couple of years. A 
histogram showing the contract-length profile of the data, which are supplied by 
ESPN, is provided in Figure 3.1.
26
 
Unlike most other professional sports leagues, no firm salary caps or free 
agent-wage restrictions exist, minimizing the possibility that firms substitute extended 
contracts for wages. Each market, however, contains different skill distributions and 
quantities of free agents, potentially producing some year-specific effects on free-
agent contracts. All regressions use year-specific dummy variables to control for any 
corresponding effects. 
Finally, costs on trading type-A and B free agents may affect contracts. Free 
agents are segregated into “types” by their productivity: type A, those in the top 20% 
for their position; type B, those within the top 21-40%; and those with no type in the 
bottom 60%. MLB contracts Elias Sports Bureau to determine which free agents are 
in the top 20% for their position (type A) and which are within the top 21-40% (type 
B). The algorithm is proprietary and not available to the public. Dummy variables 
controlling for free-agent type are included in each regression. 
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3.4.2 Worker Characteristics 
Sports Reference supplies the player productivity statistics used by this study.
27
 On-
base percentage, 𝑜𝑏𝑝, which measures the likelihood that a batter successfully gets on 
base, and slugging ratio, 𝑠𝑙𝑔, which measures the power of the batter, measure free-
agent production.
28
 Defensive production is not included because wages do not 
depend sufficiently on such productivity (see Chapter 2), thereby violating the third 
environmental condition necessary to support the efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. 
Each statistic was chosen for two reasons: 1) as argued in Section 2.2, each is 
determined by individual player productivity and should be minimally affected by 
production spillovers and complementarities, and 2) each has become a standard 
productivity measure in analyses that use MLB data. Because future productivity is 
unknown, the previous season’s productivity is used (Quirk and Fort 1992). 
This study uses data from ESPN and Sports Reference to control for free 
agents moving to different cities and their position, age, and experience. The 
nonpecuniary value of maintaining a continuous residence may provide an incentive 
for free agents to negotiate longer contracts lengths with their previous team or with a 
team based in their current city. Roughly 24% of the free agents in the sample sign 
with a firm in their current city. All regressions include a dummy variable that 
controls for free agents moving to a new city. 
Free agents may require different levels of firm investment in order to 
adequately produce in different fielding positions. For example, a catcher must learn 
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 http://www.baseball-reference.com 
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 Please see Table B.1 in Appendix B.1 for the formula for each performance statistic. 
68 
 
to read his pitchers’ abilities and those of the opposing teams’ batters to choose 
appropriate pitches. Evidence from the National Football League (Tang 2013) 
suggests that increasing such relationship-investment costs for specific positions 
correlates positively with increased contract length. Each regression includes position 
dummies to control for any investment costs associated with fielding position. 
Free agents, as previously mentioned, are generally older and more 
experienced than their non-free-agent counterparts. The approximate average age of 
32 and experience of 10 years show this characteristic of the dataset. Furthermore, 
age and experience could be associated with productivity uncertainty in MLB. 
Players, as they age, generally get weaker and slow down, potentially leading to more 
sporadic production; conversely, as they accrue more experience, they may improve 
their capabilities and become more consistent. Both are included as controls. 
3.4.3 Firm Characteristics 
Market size is a potential contract-length determinant. Free agents may want to 
extend contracts with firms based in larger markets, possibly to accrue fame or 
otherwise enjoy the advantages of a larger fan base. This study uses estimates of 
previous season firm revenue, supplied by Forbes, as a proxy for the expected market 
size of each MLB firm.
29
 As illustrated in Figure 3.2, on a firm-by-firm basis, revenue 
estimates change, on average, by roughly $8.40 million per year between 2008 and 
2011, which is roughly 4% of an average firm’s annual revenue ($206.29 million). 
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 http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/33/baseball-values-09_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Rank.html; 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/33/baseball-valuations-10_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Rank.html; 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/33/baseball-valuations-11_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Rank.html. 
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Such year-to-year changes imply that the previous season’s revenue estimate supplies 
a reasonable proxy for the proceeding season’s revenue and market size. In addition 
to controlling for market size, all regressions use firm fixed effects, which control for 
any static firm characteristic, such as weather or stadium features, that may influence 
contract length. 
3.5 Productivity Uncertainty 
The chosen productivity measures, 𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 𝑠𝑙𝑔, are inherently noisy. Over a free 
agent’s previous three seasons, the average standard deviation of his own 𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 
𝑠𝑙𝑔 is .024 and .047, which correspond to changes of roughly 19% and 10% of an 
average free agent’s wages, respectively. Such volatility should provide sufficient 
uncertainty to incentivize the more unpredictable free agents to seek longer contracts. 
This study uses two measures of uncertainty for each of the two measures of 
productivity. Because contracts are formed before the next season begins, all 
measures of uncertainty for season 𝑡 are formed from information available at the 
conclusion of season 𝑡 − 1. Each measure is derived from the magnitude of the 
residual, 𝜀?̂?−1
𝑃 , that results from the productivity forecast 
(3.1) 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
′ 𝛼𝐼 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃 , 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the chosen productivity measure (𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 𝑠𝑙𝑔) of free agent 𝑖 in 
season 𝑡 − 1, 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 comprises age and experience, 𝛿𝑖 are free-agent fixed effects, and 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃  is the error. Such a residual has been commonly used in the literature to 
construct measures of uncertainty. 
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The seven preceding seasons of 𝑃 and 𝐼 were collected for each season that a 
free agent enters the dataset, creating a total of 686 free agent-season “observations”, 
i.e. usable triplets of data (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 − 3). Because some free agents did not play 
every season and because some entered the market multiple times between 2008 and 
2010, some free agents may have between one and seven observations. This 
discrepancy between free agents may systematically affect the accuracy of the 
forecast, and therefore 𝜀̂, through the precision of 𝛿𝑖. The data, however, do not 
support any relationship between the number of observations and the precision of the 
forecast. Regressions of the magnitudes of 𝜀?̂?
𝑜𝑏𝑝
 and 𝜀?̂?
𝑠𝑙𝑔
 on the total number of 
observations for free agent 𝑖 yield small and highly insignificant estimates, suggesting 
that any effect from the precision of 𝛿𝑖 on the magnitude of 𝜀̂ is too small to affect 
analysis.
30
 
Productivity uncertainty enters Danziger’s (1988) model through two 
channels: 1) the probability that a shock to productivity will occur in the following 
period, and 2) the magnitude of that productivity shock. The first description is 
explicitly discussed by Danziger (1988), and its theorized effects on contract length 
form his efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. The second description is less important to 
the hypothesis, but no less intuitive, and may provide some interesting secondary 
support. The following two subsections each develop and discuss the corresponding 
measures of uncertainty used in this study. Because each measure functions as a 
proxy for the expected uncertainty of a free agent, each subsection discusses the 
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strength of the relationship between the measure and its future value. The summary 
statistics for each measure are included in Table 3.1. 
3.5.1 Probability of a Real Productivity Shock 
In developing the efficient risk-sharing hypothesis, Danziger (1988) uses a simple 
model that assumes productivity shocks either occur or do not with some specific 
probability. Worker productivity shocks in MLB, however, always occur to some 
degree.
31
 To bridge this discrepancy between theory and data, this study borrows 
from Wallace (2001) and defines a “large” shock as occurring whenever the 
magnitude of a free-agent’s residual from equation 3.1, 𝜀̂, is greater than the 
magnitudes of 55% of all free agents in the main sample, roughly .070 for 𝜀̂𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 
.079 for 𝜀̂𝑠𝑙𝑔. The sensitivity of this threshold is tested in Section 3.6.1. Let the 
number of observed large shocks to 𝑃 that have occurred from 𝑡 − 7 to 𝑡 − 1 for free 
agent 𝑖 be 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃  and the total number of observations in the same timeframe be 
𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1. Define the proportion of 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃  to 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 to be 𝑃𝑅𝑡−1
𝑃 =
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃
𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
, which can be 
interpreted as the past probability that a free agent experienced a large shock to 𝑃. 
Plotting 𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 against the occurrence of a large productivity shock in period 𝑡 
demonstrates a significant relationship between both. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the 
percentage of free agents who experience a large shock increases with increasing 
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 Although some players in the sample are extremely close to their predicted productivity measures, 
𝜀?̂? ≠ 0 ∀𝑖. 
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values of 𝑃𝑅.32 Only about 14% and 22% of free agents with 𝑃𝑅 = 0 receive a large 
shock to their 𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 𝑠𝑙𝑔, respectively, in the following period. The percentages 
increase to 45% and 47% for free agents whose 𝑃𝑅 values are close to .5, and the 
percentages increase to roughly 86% and 82% for free agents whose 𝑃𝑅 = 1. Such a 
relationship suggests that 𝑃𝑅 values provide a strong proxy for the expected 
probability that a significant productivity shock will occur to either 𝑜𝑏𝑝 or 𝑠𝑙𝑔. 
3.5.2 Magnitude of a Real Productivity Shock 
Studies that use worker performance data from MLB use the previous season’s 
productivity measures consistently as a proxy for the expectation of future production 
(Quirk and Fort 1992). Intuitively then, the magnitude of the previous season’s 
productivity shock, i.e. the magnitude of the residual from equation 3.1, 𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑡−1 =
|𝜀?̂?−1|, should provide a proxy for the expected magnitude of the productivity shock a 
free agent receives in the following period. But does it? The direct relationship 
between 𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑡−1 and 𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑡 provides such insight and is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
33
 
The strong clustering of observations around the dashed 𝑌 = 𝑋 line indicates a strong 
correlation between magnitudes from consecutive time periods. Such a correlation 
suggests that 𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑡−1 does provide an effective proxy. 
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 Because not all 686 observations match to a future value, only 546 observations could be included in 
Figure 3.3. 
33
 Because not all 686 observations match to a future value, only 546 observations could be included in 
Figure 3.4. 
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3.6 Results 
As previously mentioned, the available data allows a unique look into the efficient 
risk-sharing mechanism at the worker-firm level. This study regresses the length of 
the contract, 𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑓,𝑡, which was negotiated between free agent 𝑖 and firm 𝑓 and begins 
in season 𝑡, on each uncertainty measure and a set of controls: 
(3.2) 𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃′ 𝛽𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
′ 𝛽𝑃 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑋 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡−1 +
𝜃𝑓 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑓,𝑡, 
where 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃  is a vector containing either the 𝑃𝑅 or 𝑀𝐴𝐺 uncertainty measure 
of both 𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 𝑠𝑙𝑔; 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
′  is a vector containing 𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 𝑠𝑙𝑔 from the previous 
season; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′  is a vector comprising free-agent age, age squared, experience, 
experience squared, position, type, and whether he is moving to a new city; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡−1 
is the revenue of firm 𝑓 from the previous season; 𝜃𝑓 and 𝜃𝑡 are firm fixed effects and 
time dummies, respectively; and 𝑢𝑖,𝑓,𝑡 is the error. 
Table 3.2 reports the regression results for equation 3.2 in column 1, which 
contains the estimates when using 𝑃𝑅, and column 2, which contains the estimates 
when using 𝑀𝐴𝐺. Before turning to the estimates on the uncertainty measures, 
another result should be acknowledged. The joint significance of the productivity 
measures, 𝑜𝑏𝑝 and 𝑠𝑙𝑔, at the 1% level in both columns provides rare evidence that 
supports productivity as a contract-length determinant. Only a few studies using 
individual-level data even use productivity measures in contract-length regressions 
(Kahn 1993). The more common industry-level studies, which use union contracts, do 
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not have access to such data and generally ignore worker productivity. This seldom 
creates identification problems, however, because many of those contracts are not 
contingent on worker productivity or productivity is assumed to be homogenous. 
Turning back to the estimates on the uncertainty measures, they support the 
efficient risk-sharing hypothesis if three conditions are satisfied: 1) they are 
statistically significant determinants of contract length, 2) they are positive, and 3) 
their magnitudes are economically meaningful. All three conditions are satisfied. 
First, the pair of estimates on 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑀𝐴𝐺 are each jointly significant at the 5% 
level, suggesting that productivity uncertainty is a significant determinant of contract 
length in the free-agent market. Apart from the relevance of this result to the efficient 
risk-sharing hypothesis, this result is additionally important for two reasons: it is the 
first time that any uncertainty has been shown to affect the length of individual-level 
contracts, and more specifically, it is the first time that real uncertainty in a worker’s 
productivity has been shown to be a significant determinant of contract length. 
Second, the estimates for each uncertainty measure are positive, supporting 
the positive relationship between real uncertainty and contract length implied by 
Danziger (1988). Third, the magnitudes of each estimate are meaningful. For a one 
standard deviation increase in 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑃 and 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐿𝐺 , roughly .407 and .378, respectively, 
the corresponding estimates in column 1 imply an increase in contract length of .126 
and .249 years, roughly 8% and 16% of an average free agent’s contract length. These 
increases are relatively consistent with the increases to contract length implied by the 
estimates on 𝑀𝐴𝐺 in column 2. A one standard deviation increase in 𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑂𝐵𝑃 and 
75 
 
𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑆𝐿𝐺 , roughly .063 and .064, corresponds to an increase in contract length of .107 
and .162 years, roughly 7% and 11% of an average free agent’s contract length. 
Collectively, such results provide strong support for Danziger’s (1988) efficient risk-
sharing hypothesis. 
3.6.1 Sensitivity of 𝑷𝑹 Estimates to the Definition of a “Large” Shock 
Recall from Section 3.5.1 that 𝑃𝑅 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
, where a “large” shock is 
defined as occurring whenever the magnitude of a free agent’s residual from equation 
3.1, |𝜀̂|, is sufficiently large. This study uses the thresholds |𝜀̂𝑂𝐵𝑃| > .070 and 
|𝜀̂𝑆𝐿𝐺| > .079, which yield estimates in column 1 of Table 3.2 that support the 
efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. These results, however, could just be lucky. The 
choice of threshold is arbitrary, and different thresholds could yield results that do not 
support Danziger’s (1988) hypothesis. 
The sensitivity of the results in column 1 to changes in threshold is tested 
using four different pairs of threshold values: 050 and .059, .060 and .069, .080 and 
.089, and .090 and .099. The lowest pair of thresholds is larger than 38% and 44% of 
the magnitudes of 𝜀̂𝑂𝐵𝑃 and 𝜀̂𝑆𝐿𝐺  in the main sample, respectively; the highest pair is 
correspondingly larger than 67% and 65%. The resulting estimates are provided in 
columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 3.3, respectively. Column 3 provides the results from 
column 1 of Table 3.2 for comparison. 
Although the point estimates do change as the thresholds change, the 
estimates on 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑃 and 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐿𝐺  are jointly significant at the 5% level for columns 1 
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and 2 and at the 10% level for columns 4 and 5. Furthermore, all the point estimates 
are again positive and economically meaningful: the lowest estimate on 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑃 =
.240 corresponds to a 6% change in contract length for a one standard deviation 
increase, and the lowest estimate of 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐿𝐺 = .374 corresponds similarly to a 9% 
change. The relative insensitivity of the results to threshold value suggests that the 
data generally support the efficient risk-sharing hypothesis through the 𝑃𝑅 measure. 
3.6.2 Alternative Measure of Real Uncertainty (𝑺𝑬𝑬) 
Recall that the decision to use 𝑃𝑅, and less so 𝑀𝐴𝐺, derives from Danziger’s (1988) 
treatment of real uncertainty. In contrast, the majority of the literature (e.g. 
Christofides 1990; Wallace and Blanco 1991; Wallace 2001; Rich and Tracy 2004) 
follows Christofides and Wilton (1983), who use the standard error of the estimate 
(𝑆𝐸𝐸), in adopting Gray’s (1978) definition of uncertainty – forecast variance. To test 
the robustness of the efficient risk-sharing hypothesis to Gray’s (1978) definition of 
uncertainty, equation 3.2 is estimated with 𝑆𝐸𝐸 measures. The residuals, 𝜀̂, from past 
time periods are used to create an aggregate measure similar to the standard error of 
𝑃, specifically 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 = √
∑ ?̂?𝑡−1−𝑗
2
𝑗
𝑁
, where, in this study, 𝑗 ∈ [0,6] and 𝑁 is the 
number of observations used. The summary statistics are provided in Table 3.1. 
Although 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑆𝐸𝐸 are quite correlated, 𝜌𝑃𝑅,𝑆𝐸𝐸
𝑂𝐵𝑃 = .83 and 𝜌𝑃𝑅,𝑆𝐸𝐸
𝑆𝐿𝐺 = .85, 
a Wald test for joint significance of the 𝑆𝐸𝐸 estimates, which are provided in column 
1 of Table 3.4, is highly insignificant. Such a result can be supported by either of two 
explanations: 1) there exists some characteristic in MLB that creates measurement 
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error in the 𝑆𝐸𝐸 measures of uncertainty, or 2) Gray’s (1978) definition of 
uncertainty is not relevant to the relationship between productivity uncertainty and 
contract length in MLB. Although identifying which explanation causes the 
insignificance and why is beyond the scope of this study, a simple test can provide 
some useful information. If the free agents with uncorrelated 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑆𝐸𝐸 measures 
are removed from the data and the resulting estimates become significant, then the 
relationship between productivity uncertainty and contract length is sensitive to how 
uncertainty is measured. Although this result cannot identify which explanation 
drives the original insignificance of the 𝑆𝐸𝐸 measures, it does imply that either the 
first explanation holds or the second holds with 𝑆𝐸𝐸 acting as a proxy for 𝑃𝑅. If, 
however, the estimates remain insignificant, then the second explanation is likely 
correct. 
The relationship between 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑆𝐸𝐸 is illustrated in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. 
The observed dispersion of 𝑆𝐸𝐸 values at each level of 𝑃𝑅, particularly for 𝑠𝑙𝑔, 
suggests that the correlation between the two measures is smallest for the free agents 
that have high values of 𝑆𝐸𝐸 at lower relative values of 𝑃𝑅. Ten such observations 
are easily identifiable in Figures 3.5 and 3.6: one with 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑃 ≈ .198 and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑃 =
.8, seven with 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐿𝐺 > .167 and 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐿𝐺 ∈ (. 666, .834), and two with 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐿𝐺 ∈
(. 117, .133) and 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐿𝐺 = .4.34 Removing just these observations yields estimates, 
provided in column 2 of Table 3.4, that are jointly significant at the 10% level. 
Furthermore, the estimates on both 𝑆𝐸𝐸 measures are positive and economically 
                                                 
34
 Eliminating further observations reduces sample size without significantly strengthening the 
relationship between 𝑆𝐸𝐸 and 𝑃𝑅. 
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meaningful. An increase of one standard deviation in 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑃 and 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐿𝐺 , roughly 
.060 and .059, respectively, corresponds to an increase in contract length of .139 and 
.136 years, both roughly 9% of an average free agent’s contract length and consistent 
with the results from 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑀𝐴𝐺. These results support Danziger’s (1988) efficient 
risk-sharing hypothesis and suggest that the relationship between real uncertainty and 
contract length is sensitive to whatever causes the divergence between 𝑃𝑅 and 𝑆𝐸𝐸 
for those free agents removed from the data. 
But what could cause certain free agents’ 𝑆𝐸𝐸 measures to be “too” high 
while their 𝑃𝑅 measures are not? This can only occur in the data when a predictable 
free agent has one or two spectacularly unexpected performances, an event that 
makes sense in the context of MLB. Large single season shocks to productivity, like a 
bad injury (negative) or an uncharacteristically productive year (positive), are not 
particularly rare (Krautmann 1990) and could explain how relatively predictable free 
agents deviate significantly from expectations once or twice. Just as interesting, such 
shocks likely affect the power of a batter (𝑠𝑙𝑔) far more than his accuracy (𝑜𝑏𝑝), 
potentially explaining why 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑙𝑔 has more outlier observations than 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑃. 
Such a story would support the first explanation and, therefore, would be consistent 
with Gray’s (1978) definition of uncertainty affecting contract length in MLB. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Does uncertainty generated from real shocks to worker productivity affect the length 
of a worker’s contract? If so, does the relationship between real uncertainty and 
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contract length support Danziger’s (1988) efficient risk-sharing hypothesis? The 
evidence suggests they do. Not only do the results of this study indicate that 
productivity uncertainty is a significant contract-length determinant, but they also 
support the efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. The results are consistent across two 
measures of uncertainty (three with modifications) for two types of worker 
productivity and are robust to a variety of contract-length determinants, including, but 
not exclusive to, contracting-cost, indexation, relationship investment, information-
cost, and bargaining-power effects. In addition, these results should be independent of 
Gray’s (1978) efficient-production mechanism. 
The individual-level data and observed matching between free agents and 
firms allow worker- and firm-specific controls, a key advantage over previous studies 
that rely on aggregate controls for union contracts. As such, this study introduces into 
the literature the first contract-length analysis of real uncertainty that uses individual-
level data; more specifically, it provides the first individual-level analysis of the 
efficient risk-sharing hypothesis. 
The three measures of productivity uncertainty used in this study provide 
different insights into the relationship between productivity uncertainty and contract 
length. The first, which measures the probability that a worker’s productivity will 
deviate sufficiently from his expected level, tests the efficient risk-sharing hypothesis 
with Danziger’s (1988) own treatment of uncertainty. The second measure, which is 
derived from Danziger’s (1988) model, tests whether the magnitude of that deviation 
affects contract length. Finding that both measures significantly increase contract 
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length suggests that both the expected frequency and magnitude of shocks matter 
when negotiating contract lengths. Finally, the third measure, which is the standard 
error of the estimate, tests whether Danziger’s (1988) hypothesis is robust to Gray’s 
(1978) definition of uncertainty. The sensitivity of the measure may suggest that the 
characteristics of different uncertainty measures may make certain measures better at 
measuring uncertainty in different environments. Such a finding could help explain 
why real uncertainty has been found to affect contract length differently in various 
industries; however, far more research is needed before any conclusions can be 
drawn.  
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TABLES 
Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Contract Length [years]  182 1.527 1.160 1 8 
On-base Percentage, 𝑜𝑏𝑝  182 .333 .035 .244 .439 
Slugging Ratio, 𝑠𝑙𝑔  182 .411 .074 .241 .627 
Probability of a “Shock”, 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑃 
 182 .474 .407 0 1 
Probability of a “Shock”, 
𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐿𝐺  
 182 .477 .382 0 1 
Magnitude of Residual, 
𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑂𝐵𝑃 
 182 .080 .063 .001 .336 
Magnitude of Residual, 
𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑆𝐿𝐺  
 182 .084 .064 .000 .361 
Standard Error of Estimate, 
𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑃 
 182 .084 .060 .003 .339 
Standard Error of Estimate, 
𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐿𝐺  
 182 .095 .059 .009 .326 
Age [years]  182 31.648 3.285 24 41 
Experience [years]  182 10.456 3.471 4 21 
Moving to a New City  182 .764†    
Type-A Free Agent  182 .111
†
    
Type-B Free Agent  182 .126
†
    
No-Type Free Agent  182 .763
†
    
Position: Outfielder  182 .326
†
    
Position: Infielder  182 .316
†
    
Position: 1
st
 Baseman  182 .142
†
    
Position: Catcher  182 .200
†
    
Position: Designated Hitter  182 .016
†
    
Free Agents in 2008 Market  182 .269
†
    
Free Agents in 2009 Market  182 .379
†
    
Free Agents in 2010 Market  182 .352
†
    
Firm Revenue [$100 million]  90 2.0629 .5410 1.4456 4.6305 
Firm revenue is inflation adjusted to 2011 dollars. † “Mean” values correspond to the proportion of free agents in 
the sample that fall into each category. 
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Table 3.2 
Contract Length & Productivity Uncertainty 
Dependent Variable: 
Contract Length 
 Probability of Shock, 
𝑷𝑹 
(1) 
 Magnitude of Shock, 
𝑴𝑨𝑮 
(2) 
Uncertainty in 𝑜𝑏𝑝 .311 
(.188) 
1.701 
(1.116) 
Uncertainty in 𝑠𝑙𝑔 .660*** 
(.247) 
2.530* 
(1.352) 
   
On-base % (𝑜𝑏𝑝) 4.072 
(2.815) 
4.151 
(2.823) 
Slugging Ratio (𝑠𝑙𝑔) 3.952** 
(1.537) 
3.201** 
(1.427) 
Age -.547 
(.498) 
-.471 
(.503) 
Age
2 
.008 
(.008) 
.007 
(.008) 
Experience .095 
(.182) 
.094 
(.195) 
Experience
2 
-.007 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.008) 
New City  -.165 
(.189) 
-.157 
(.200) 
Type-A Free Agent  1.392*** 
(.407) 
1.498*** 
(.423) 
Type-B Free Agent .492** 
(.225) 
.442* 
(.236) 
First Baseman .086 
(.249) 
.120 
(.245) 
Infielder .241 
(.212) 
.193 
(.218) 
Catcher .117 
(.244) 
.026 
(.242) 
Designated Hitter .378 
(.520) 
.215 
(.546) 
Firm Revenue -1.797 
(1.251) 
-1.960 
(1.302) 
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. In addition to the above variables, all regressions control for season and firm fixed effects. Each 
regression uses 182 observations and has 134 d.f. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Table 3.4 
Contract Length and 𝑺𝑬𝑬 
Dependent: 
Contract Length 
 
Full Sample 
 
10 Observations Removed 
(1) (2) 
𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑃 
1.574 
(1.254) 
2.311* 
(1.340) 
𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐿𝐺  
1.209 
(1.398) 
2.311 
(1.605) 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. All regressions additionally control for age, age squared, experience, 
experience squared, moving to a new city, free-agent type, position, market size, season, and firm fixed effects. 
The regression provided in column 1 uses 182 observations and has 134 d.f.; the regression in column 2 uses 172 
observations and has 124 d.f. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
 
  
Table 3.3 
Sensitivity of 𝑷𝑹 to the Definition of a “Large” Shock 
Dependent: 
Contract 
Length 
 
|?̂?𝒐𝒃𝒑|
≥. 𝟎𝟓𝟎 
|?̂?𝒔𝒍𝒈|
≥. 𝟎𝟓𝟗 
Large 
Shock: 
 
𝒐𝒃𝒑
≥. 𝟎𝟔𝟎 
𝒔𝒍𝒈
≥. 𝟎𝟔𝟗 
Large 
Shock: 
 
𝒐𝒃𝒑
≥. 𝟎𝟕𝟎 
𝒔𝒍𝒈
≥. 𝟎𝟕𝟗 
Large 
Shock: 
 
𝒐𝒃𝒑
≥. 𝟎𝟖𝟎 
𝒔𝒍𝒈
≥. 𝟎𝟖𝟗 
Large 
Shock: 
 
𝒐𝒃𝒑
≥. 𝟎𝟗𝟎 
𝒔𝒍𝒈
≥. 𝟎𝟗𝟗 
Large 
Shock: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑃 
.242 
(.206) 
.240 
(.202) 
.311 
(.188) 
.397* 
(.211) 
.378* 
(.193) 
𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐿𝐺  
.611** 
(.240) 
.747*** 
(.263) 
.660*** 
(.247) 
.464* 
(.239) 
.374 
(.238) 
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 
1% level. All regressions additionally control for age, age squared, experience, experience squared, moving to a new 
city, free-agent type, position, market size, season, and firm fixed effects. Each regression uses 182 observations and 
has 134 d.f. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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A.1: Additional Advantages of Professional Sports Data 
Industry, firm, and team characteristics in professional sports leagues remove 
potential effects from team and firm structure, firm entry and exit, and fluctuations in 
consumer demand common to other industries that may confound team-quality 
measurement or influence the value of team quality endogenously. Team structure 
within a firm is not always well defined in a dataset. Incorrectly matching workers to 
their respective teams pairs each worker with an incorrect value of team quality, 
thereby introducing measurement error into the team quality variable. The more 
teams a firm has, the more exacerbated the matching problem. Generally, each firm in 
a professional sports league contains a single team, implicitly identifying the worker-
team match. An industry of single-team firms also removes cross-team spillovers and 
complementarities within a firm. The presence of other teams may create spillovers 
through between-team competition or provide production complementarities, such as 
a worker in an architecture team benefitting from working alongside a good 
construction team. These factors may bias team-quality estimates in the same way as 
the within-team spillovers and complementarities discussed in Section 2.2. 
Many industries experience fluid firm entrance and exit and/or comprise firms 
that routinely construct and disband teams. The fluctuating supply of available teams 
in these industries may affect the market value of team quality to workers. For 
example, if a worker believes more teams will soon exist, the value of immediately 
contracting to a good team may diminish. Fortunately, the number of firms in most 
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professional sports leagues is fixed (e.g. MLB has exactly 30 firms), removing any 
fluctuations in team supply. 
In many industries, firms match team production to fluctuations in consumer 
demand for its product. If sufficient hiring and firing frictions exist, then increasing or 
decreasing team production requires parallel changes to worker productivity, creating 
measurement error in worker productivity measures. In contrast, a professional athlete 
will produce at his skill level regardless of current consumer demand. 
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A.2: TABLES 
Table A.1 
Performance Statistics 
 Statistic  Formula  Description 
      
F
ie
ld
in
g
 
𝑓𝑙𝑑  
𝑃𝑂 + 𝐴
𝑇𝐶
  
𝑃𝑂 counts the number of 
outs made, 𝐴 counts the 
number of assisted outs, and 
𝑇𝐶 totals all fielded balls 
and equals 𝑃𝑂 + 𝐴 +
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠. 
      
H
it
ti
n
g
 
𝑜𝑏𝑝  
𝑊 + 1𝐵 + 2𝐵 + 3𝐵 + 4𝐵
𝑃𝐴−
  
𝑊 counts the total number 
of walks; 1𝐵, 2𝐵, 3𝐵, and 
4𝐵 count the number of 
each type of hit that goes the 
respective number of bases 
(1, 2, 3, or 4); and 𝑃𝐴− 
counts the number of total 
plate appearances (minus 
catcher interferences and 
bunts). 
     
𝑠𝑙𝑔  
1𝐵 + 2 × 2𝐵 + 3 × 3𝐵 + 4 × 4𝐵
𝐴𝐵
  
The numerator counts the 
total number of bases 
reached. 𝐴𝐵 counts the total 
at bats, which equals 𝑃𝐴− 
minus 𝑊. Please see 𝑜𝑏𝑝 for 
additional detail. 
      
P
it
ch
in
g
 
𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏  
𝑆𝑂
𝐵𝐵
  
𝑆𝑂 counts the total number 
of strikeouts, and 𝐵𝐵 counts 
the total number of walks. 
     
𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓  
𝑆𝑂
𝐵𝐹
  
𝑆𝑂 counts the total number 
of strikeouts, and 𝐵𝐹 counts 
the total number of batters 
faced. 
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Table A.2 
Corrected Bins for Card Prices 
Bin #  2008  2009  2010 
0  0 (No Card)  0 (No Card)  0 (No Card ) 
1  .12  .15 (1) & .12 (2)  .15 (1) & .12 (2) 
2  
.20 
.30 
 .25 (1) & .20 (2)  .25 
3  .40  .40  .40 
4  .50  .50  .50 
5  .60  .60  .60 
6  .75  1.0  1.0 
Collapsing 2008’s seven bins into six does lose information, but it keeps card prices consistent across years. Bin 
#2 was linked across years by meticulously matching many players and their card values. Column 1 corresponds 
to prices for the first of two prints in a card series, whereas column 2 corresponds to prices from the second. Only 
seven free agents in the data receive their card price from the second series, and removing them has no 
measureable effect on the results. Both 2008 prints (used for the 2009 season) have the same prices for both series, 
unlike the proceeding years in bins #1 and #2. Bold and underlined prices correspond to the actual prices 
assigned to each bin. For example, a 2008 card worth .30 in the February 2009 price guide is assigned a price of 
.25, or a 2009 card from the second print worth .12 in February 2010 is assigned a price of .15. 
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Table A.3 
Estimates of Winning-Percentage Regression 
Variable  Coefficient 
Average Team 𝑜𝑏𝑝  
187.667 
(118.018) 
Average Team 𝑜𝑏𝑝2  
38.201 
(29.215) 
Average Team 𝑠𝑙𝑔  
-62.600 
(75.043) 
Average Team 𝑠𝑙𝑔2  
-7.218 
(11.243) 
Average Team 𝑓𝑙𝑑  
-678.582** 
(336.065) 
Average Team 𝑓𝑙𝑑2  
354.610** 
(170.080) 
Average Team 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏  
-13.584*** 
(2.947) 
Average Team 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏2  
-.102*** 
(.028) 
Average Team 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓  
104.040 
(77.716) 
Average Team 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓2  
-40.573** 
(19.546) 
Interaction (𝑜𝑏𝑝 x 𝑠𝑙𝑔)  
-35.120 
(35.387) 
Interaction (𝑜𝑏𝑝 x 𝑓𝑙𝑑)  
-197.157* 
(115.263) 
Interaction (𝑜𝑏𝑝 x 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏)  
3.470** 
(1.606) 
Interaction (𝑜𝑏𝑝 x 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓)  
-61.863** 
(25.860) 
Interaction (𝑠𝑙𝑔 x 𝑓𝑙𝑑)  
79.816 
(76.262) 
Interaction (𝑠𝑙𝑔 x 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏)  
-2.069* 
(1.180) 
Interaction (𝑠𝑙𝑔 x 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓)  
41.746** 
(20.779) 
Interaction (𝑓𝑙𝑑 x 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏)  
13.394*** 
(3.188) 
Interaction (𝑓𝑙𝑑 x 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓)  
-95.308 
(80.324) 
Interaction (𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑏 x 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑓)  
3.514** 
(1.336) 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level. The regression also controls for the division within which a team plays. 
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Table A.4 
Percentage of Revenue Spent on Luxury Tax 
Team  2009  2010  2011 
New York Yankees  5.83%  4.22%  3.16% 
Boston Red Sox  0%  .55%  1.10% 
No other MLB firms paid luxury tax for the 2009, 2010, or 2011 seasons. The percentages are calculated from 
luxury tax data provided by The Associated Press and Forbes. 
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Figure A.1 
Histogram of Free-Agent Age 
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B.1: TABLES 
Table B.1 
Performance Statistics 
Statistic  Formula  Description 
𝑜𝑏𝑝  
𝑊 + 1𝐵 + 2𝐵 + 3𝐵 + 4𝐵
𝑃𝐴−
  
𝑊 counts the total number of 
walks; 1𝐵, 2𝐵, 3𝐵, and 4𝐵 count 
the number of each type of hit 
that goes the respective number 
of bases (1, 2, 3, or 4); and 𝑃𝐴− 
counts the number of total plate 
appearances (minus catcher 
interferences and bunts). 
     
𝑠𝑙𝑔  
1𝐵 + 2 × 2𝐵 + 3 × 3𝐵 + 4 × 4𝐵
𝐴𝐵
  
The numerator counts the total 
number of bases reached. 𝐴𝐵 
counts the total at bats, which 
equals 𝑃𝐴− minus 𝑊. Please see 
𝑜𝑏𝑝 for additional detail. 
 
Table B.2 
Regression of the Magnitude of ?̂? on the Number of 
Observations (i.e. Usable Triplets) 
Dependent Variable: 
Magnitude of Shock, |?̂?| 
 Magnitude of 𝜺𝒐𝒃𝒑  Magnitude of 𝜺𝒔𝒍𝒈 
# of Usable Triplets 
(𝑡, 𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 2) 
 
.0015 
(.0022) 
 
.0015 
(.0024) 
constant  
.0719*** 
(.0119) 
 
.0803*** 
(.0131) 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level. Each regression used 686 observations. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
 
